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There is a broad consensus that major 
shortcomings in risk management were a 
primary cause of the financial crisis and 
that an overhaul of systems and 
approaches was needed to protect the 
global banking system.
In this issue of Quantum – Finance in 
Perspective, a quarterly magazine published on behalf of the 
Qatar Financial Centre Authority, we examine how banks are 
modernising their risk management regimes, and assess the quality  
of the regulations being introduced by regulators and governments.
Brian Caplen applauds the changes that have been made, but also 
warns that there is much “unfinished business”. He says that it is 
proving difficult to find suitably qualified people to sit on boards, that 
systems for data collection and reporting need to be modernised and 
the culture within institutions changed. Banks, he says, are “struggling 
to put together a blueprint for the next five to 10 years”.
Caplen also warns that the impact of new regulations may be  
diluted as banks may disperse risk into less tightly controlled parts of 
the financial sector. And Brandon Davies explains his concern at 
the way risk is now measured, warning that if the tools being used are 
inappropriate, “the result may be a very accurate wrong answer – and, 
consequently, disaster, as with the current series of financial crises”.
Bankers also have to reckon with the fragile state of the  
global economy, which has failed to deliver the expected recovery.  
David Smith says that, while there are some grounds for 
long-term optimism, the immediate outlook is difficult, with  
the current slow-down spreading to the non-OECD world.
The institutions that cope best in these circumstances are likely to  
be – as they have always been – those which think innovatively.  
Victor Smart examines the growing role of analytics, the analysis of 
data to fine-tune decision-making, in banking strategy. He reports 
that complex modelling is now at the heart of pricing illiquid 
sophisticated financial instruments, while high street banks can 
experiment with new offers, tying in the profitable and freezing out  
the unprofitable customer.
We also examine the new business opportunities 
available in one of the world’s last significant untapped 
economies. William Selig writes that while there is 
risk involved in entering Myanmar, “so there is also  
a risk that those who hesitate will be left behind when 
growth takes off”.6         uantum Finance in PeSPecTiVe   OCTOBER 2012
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ibor  is  in  trouble  again. 
Following a series of scandals, 
the British government asked 
financier Martin Wheatley to 
head an inquiry into how the key bench-
mark borrowing rate is set. His grim 
conclusion was that “Libor is no longer 
fit for purpose”. Wheatley, the manag-
ing director of the Financial Services 
Authority’s conduct business unit, then 
released  a  draft  discussion  document 
setting out options for improving or re-
placing Libor.
This analysis of the role of Libor is long 
overdue. In the April 2008 issue of Quan-
tum, I pointed out that Libor had broken 
in  the  previous  August  because  banks 
were setting the rate much lower than 
their  true  borrowing  costs  and  traders 
were manipulating it for advantage. How-
ever, I predicted reform efforts would get 
bogged down.
Although Wheatley has not ruled out 
scrapping Libor completely, the propos-
als he has put on the table are very simi-
lar to those I suggested four and a half 
years ago. The only major ones I missed 
were those to increase regulatory over-
sight of the process and impose tougher 
penalties for manipulation.
While I stand by my prediction that 
any fixes will be minor, I admit one ma-
jor error. While I did not specify a time-
frame, I assumed then that it would take 
Aaron Brown, a long-time observer of Libor, 
analyses the latest controversies involving 
misuse of the key benchmark borrowing rate 
and asks whether it is salvageable.
about a year – or perhaps a little longer – 
to address the issues. The reality proved 
rather  different.  When  I  re-examined 
the subject last year, my conclusion was 
that  no  one  cared  about  these  abuses 
and that it looked as if there would be 
no  consequences  at  all.  There  can  be 
no sensible explanation for the fact that 
governments and regulators ignored the 
problem for five years and then decided 
on a solution that was obvious from the 
moment that Libor ceased to fulfil many 
of its key functions.
Time-lapse is not the only way the re-
port  seems  disconnected  from  reality. 
Wheatley seems to write as if Libor is an 
official policy rate set by the UK govern-
ment. In fact, Libor gained traction in the 
financial world slowly – essentially since 
the early 1960s – by having characteris-
tics that set it ahead of competing rates. 
Changing Libor will change whether peo-
ple use it, and for what purposes.
Libor has already been replaced as the 
main rate used by mathematical model-
lers of interest rates. When it broke in 
August  2007,  it  became  impossible  to 
calibrate a consistent forward curve us-
ing Libor rates. That meant it could not 
be used to price or measure the risk of any 
derivatives. It is obvious why bad Libor 
data would mess up interest-rate deriva-
tive calculations, but even other types of 
derivatives require future cashflows to be 
Conduct 
unbecoming
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discounted, so they need a consistent ref-
erence rate. Today modellers for the most 
part use overnight index swap rates, plus 
some other swap rates, eurodollar futures 
and treasury rates.
However, Libor remains the most com-
mon nominal reference rate in interest-
rate derivative contracts. There is a prob-
lem when a contract is written in one rate 
and priced in another. People are willing 
to live with the problem because it is so im-
portant to have a single nominal reference 
rate for almost all contracts. If your corpo-
rate loan is tied to Libor, you want to be 
able to do an interest-rate swap referenc-
ing Libor, and if you trade that, you want 
a funding contract in Libor. Anything else 
creates what is called “basis risk”. This is 
wasted risk, as it represents risk for both 
parties to a contract. Using a different rate 
for modelling creates a virtual basis risk, 
but people are always willing to assume a 
virtual risk to avoid an actual risk.
When Wheatley proposes using “al-
ternatives to Libor for at least some of 
its  current  uses”,  he  doesn’t  seem  to 
realise that this action may destroy the 
main reason for people continuing to 
use Libor. In effect, replacing Libor for 
some purposes, or discouraging its use 
in general, might kill it altogether. That 
might not be a bad thing, except that we 
don’t know what the replacement will 
be. Another possibility is that there will 
be multiple reference rates, creating a 
large pool of unnecessary basis risk.
On the other hand, if the UK decides 
to fix rather than replace Libor, it may 
change it in such a way that it becomes 
unsuitable for some current uses. For ex-
ample, before Libor broke it was generally 
assumed it was close to the rate at which 
you could finance high-quality assets or 
invest  cash.  That  assumption  is  impor-
tant for a smoothly functioning financial 
system. If Libor is fixed, it may no longer 
represent both rates, and there may be 
no replacement that can do the job. If 
the rate at which assets can be financed 
is significantly higher than the rate paid 
on cash, it becomes a significant drag on 
financial markets. Libor helped force the 
two together, and an alternative designed 
by government might not be up to the job.
Another  pitfall  of  reforming  Libor  is 
keeping it distinct from the nearly identi-
cal rate on eurodollar futures contracts. 
Libor is an official rate, set once a day 
without ambiguity, which makes it suit-
able for legal contracts and derivatives. 
Eurodollar  futures  measure  essentially 
the same thing, but tick up and down in 
price many times a second, at the whim of 
traders. Libor is more stable and rational, 
eurodollar futures rates are more precise 
and  market-driven.  Proposals  to  make 
Libor more of a market rate could make 
it impossible to maintain the distinction, 
and thereby reduce diversity within the 
financial system. Short-term interest rates 
are so crucial to markets that it is impor-
tant to have independent, redundant sys-
tems for measuring and controlling them.
The final major use of Libor is to moni-
tor  the  health  of  the  banking  system. 
When Libor is higher than government 
bond rates, it means that the credit of the 
banking system is in doubt. The height 
and steepness of the Libor curve relative 
to  other  interest-rate  curves  gives  im-
portant information about liquidity and 
jump-to-default risk. Any attempt to go 
in the opposite direction and make Libor 
a market rate – but making the setting 
more bureaucratic and rigid – could result 
in the loss of this information. There is a 
real danger that Libor could become the 
official story instead of the truth.
None of this is to deny that Libor needs 
some attention. But a sudden political re-
sponse to five-year-old problems creates 
the danger that Libor will be destroyed or 
transformed into something useless. Yes, 
Libor engaged in behaviour unbecoming a 
reference rate. But financial markets need 
a tough reference rate, and a gentleman’s 
rate may not survive. I wish the Wheatley 
report showed more respect and affection 
for its achievements and more caution in 
proposals to fix it. Libor has helped make 
the world rich, and a robust, trustworthy 
Libor can help make it richer. 
     Replacing Libor for some purposes,  
or discouraging its use in general, 
might kill it altogether. That might
not be a bad thing, except we don’t 
know what the replacement will be
People will talk about 
ways to make Libor setting 
more transparent. one 
idea will be to switch 
to a backward-looking 
rate, like eonia (euro 
overnight index average, 
which has analogues in 
other currencies). asking 
banks what they paid for 
overnight funding yesterday 
is less subject to judgment 
than asking them what 
they offer to pay today. 
another will be to move to 
an auction process, or to 
use a market-set rate like 
the repo rate for standard 
collateral. Then there will 
be suggestions for various 
tweaks, like making the 
panel of banks larger or 
smaller or changing the 
aggregation rule.
My prediction is none 
of these proposals will be 
successful. There may be 
some nominal change, 
perhaps in the wording 
of the rules for Libor 
submissions, perhaps in 
a retrospective statistical 
report by the BBa on Libor 
submission consistency. But 
i think Libor will continue 
to be fixed in pretty much 
the same way as it has in 
the past.
Quantum, april 2008 
BROWN’S WARNING...
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Most banks now understand 
the importance of risk 
management, but despite their 
best efforts there is still serious 
work to be done before the 
system is capable of surviving 
whatever financial tsunamis 
may strike.
B
anking is undergoing a once-in-
a-century transformation and, unsur-
prisingly, this is causing a massive up-
heaval and disruption, as well as some 
unintended consequences. The overhaul of risk 
management is central to this catharsis, with all 
leading institutions accepting that there were ma-
jor shortcomings in the governance, systems and 
approaches in place before the financial crisis. 
There is evidence that some significant changes 
have already been undertaken, with risk strategy 
now becoming a central part of board responsi-
bilities. Risk teams have been expanded and given 
By BRIan CaplEn
Work 
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real powers, while the chief risk officer (CRO) has 
much greater independence and status.
Old  risk  management  models  of  measuring 
value at risk and economic capital – upon which 
firms  were  wholly  reliant  pre-crisis  to  flag  up 
areas of concern, but which in fact had severe 
limitations – now form only part of a much larger 
armoury, including stress-testing and assessment 
of both counterparty and liquidity risk. Indeed, 
managing  liquidity  risk  has  probably  received 
more attention from banks and regulators than 
any other facet of banking, a reaction to the way 
liquidity  vanished  from  the  system  during  the 
worst periods of the crisis.
Yet for all this Herculean effort, there is still 
unfinished  business.  Finding  suitably  qualified 
candidates to sit on boards is proving a challenge, 
and those that do make the grade complain of 
information overload. Measurement of risk has 
improved, but banks are struggling to produce 
effective metrics to apply to business units. Sys-
tems for data-collection and reporting that were 
designed for a different era may simply not be up 
to the job. Obtaining a total picture of a global 
bank’s risks is thus proving elusive.
Then there is the thorny issue of culture: few 
banks can honestly say that they have embed-
ded  a  risk  culture  from  top  to  bottom.  This 
would require all the right incentives to be in 
place, as well as the wholesale embrace by hun-
dreds  of  thousands  of  employees  around  the 
world of a common code of ethics and integrity. 
This is clearly a long-term project that may re-
quire a generational change.
While  this  internal  risk  revolution  is  being 
carried out, banks have to deal with a raft of 
new regulations (of which Basel III is the lead 
component)  that  have  an  impact  on  their  risk 
management. The main thrust of these regula-
tions is to ensure that banks are properly capital-
ised, have ample liquidity and suitable business 
models, so that they can survive whatever finan-
cial tsunamis may hit them.
Add all this up and it becomes easier to appre-
ciate why bankers are running around in circles 
trying to work out which aspect of their business 
to reform next, and why they are struggling to put 
together a blueprint for the next five to 10 years. 
The harsh reality is that a combination of the new 
regulations  and  the  banks’  own  reassessment 
of risk makes many fundamental banking busi-
nesses unviable. Quite simply, the higher amounts 
of capital that need to be held change the cost/ 
revenue dynamics. Operations that could be cur-
tailed include such bread-and-butter activities as 
trade finance and small-business lending, as well 
as more specialised areas such as project and in-
frastructure finance. The mainstream bank of the 
future is going to be more narrow and conserva-
tive in its outlook. While some may feel this is a 
desirable result, given the excesses the financial 
sector indulged in previously, it does have serious 
implications for economic growth and, ironically, 
for financial stability.
There are two possible outcomes. Either bank 
lending becomes so severely restricted that firms 
cannot obtain the funds they need to expand and 
the economy flat-lines; or – and, possibly, as well 
– essential banking business migrates to unregu-
lated institutions. These would include pension 
and insurance companies, asset managers, hedge 
funds and private equity firms, as well as internet 
start-ups that perform activities such as crowd 
funding  and  peer-to-peer  lending.  Collectively 
these players are known as the shadow banking 
sector, and there are obvious concerns that, if 
these businesses remain unregulated, there may 
be a massive build-up of risk which will have sys-
temic implications. If so, this would be a major 
unintended consequence of all the new risk and 
regulatory initiatives.
Meanwhile, banks are obliged to concentrate 
on the detail of their risk management systems, 
and the evidence is that they are making reason-
able headway in some areas. A recent survey of 
global financial services firms found that 87 per 
cent now have board risk committees (which was 
not the case pre-crisis), and 82 per cent of CROs 
report directly to the CEO or jointly to the CEO 
and the board risk committee. In the old days, 
CROs were often left out of strategy decisions, 
were not involved in the design of new products 
and often reported to the CFO.
Conducted by Ernst & Young in conjunction 
with  the  Institute  of  International  Finance, 
this is the third annual such survey since the 
crisis. This means it can plot the changes in 
thinking and operations over that time period. 
Altogether,  75  firms  with  head  offices  in  38 
countries were surveyed.
There is now widespread acceptance in banking 
that a firm’s risk appetite and risk strategy must be 
set at board level. But organising the institution to 
achieve that result and then having those edicts 
take hold throughout the firm can be challenging. 
Since the crisis, the role of bank board director 
has become far less attractive. The “good and the 
great” who would have taken up these posts may 
now shy away because they fear the bad public-
ity if mistakes are made. Many were in any case 
unsuitable for the job, but there is a shortage of 
senior executives with a risk and banking back-
ground to fill the gap.
Those who do take up the challenge often 
Bankers are running around in 
circles trying to work out which 
aspect of their business to reform 
next, and … are struggling to
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find  themselves  overwhelmed.  Staff  whose 
responsibility is to inform the board are liable 
to heap thousands of pages of unedited and un-
structured information on their desks. Rather 
than pick out the highlights, it is easier to give 
the board directors everything, as this enables 
staff to avoid criticism for leaving something 
out. The result is that board members are con-
fronted with far more material than they can 
reasonably be expected to digest.
All  the  same,  some  banks  are  managing 
to  put  into  effect  frameworks  that  are  quite 
specific  in  character  and  apparently  robust. 
National Australia Bank, for example, has come 
up with a “risk appetite statement” consisting 
of three elements. These are the risk budget – 
the economic capital limit the bank must stay 
within; the risk posture, which considers the 
capacity and willingness to take risk in the dif-
ferent business areas; and risk settings which 
lay down the key operational limits.
Below board level, risk teams are being ex-
panded; in the E&Y/IIF survey 57 per cent of 
firms said they had increased staff, with 36 per 
cent reporting that this would continue into the 
coming year. Even when the teams are larger, the 
tricky part is to improve the model and methods 
used, while at the same time not becoming so 
enslaved to one particular approach, with the 
result  that  the  firm  are  blind  to  unexpected 
and unlikely developments – so-called long-tail 
events. The other big challenge is to give the dif-
ferent business units targets they can work with 
and to embed a risk culture into the breadth of 
an organisation. Much less progress has been 
made in achieving some of these aims.
The big change in modelling has been the wider 
use of stress-testing, which takes a more compre-
hensive approach to risk measurement than was 
previously the case. Old models were found to 
be lacking in their ability to pick up correlations 
between different asset classes. There was also 
insufficient understanding of counterparty risk, a 
lack of data to make good assumptions and, at the 
same time, too much reliance on pure models and 
data and a reluctance to ask awkward questions.
Stress-testing may address some of these con-
cerns, but it is already becoming apparent that 
it has its own limitations. For a start, it is a long-
winded and cumbersome business going through 
a bank’s portfolio loan by loan and item by item. 
It may take three months to complete and only be 
performed once a year, meaning that more often 
than not the information is out of date.
Worse still, stress-testing may not be sufficient-
ly outward-looking and so can end up ignoring 
the major macro-economic risks facing a bank, 
such as in the European sovereign debt crisis. A 
recent McKinsey report points out that to account 
properly for that crisis in a stress-testing exercise, 
banks need to consider how they will cope with 
such things as a severe funding squeeze, econom-
ic stagnation, capital shortfalls and a lack of risk-
free assets (if sovereign debt becomes tainted).
McKinsey recommends a five-step approach to 
scenario-planning and stress-testing, designed to 
bring all the various elements of the process to-
gether and to account for variable outcomes. One 
bank which may not be needing McKinsey’s help, 
however,  is  the  Royal  Bank  of  Canada,  which 
runs more than 30 stress scenarios every night so 
that it can understand how the portfolio would 
fare under numerous different outcomes.
At the end of the day, no model can be con-
sidered fail-safe. Fundamental risk management 
must always contain an element of pure human 
judgment on what seems sensible. Banks must 
have a risk culture that allows such hunches to 
be listened to and not dismissed out of hand. This 
was woefully missing in the pre-crisis banking 
environment, and the case for saying that banks 
have now got this in their DNA is weak. Risk 
management is definitely a work in progress. 
      Measurement of risk has 
improved, but banks are 
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Banks are under pressure 
as asset managers and 
large corporations move 
onto their territory. The 
danger, says Brian Caplen, 
is that clamping down  
on banks will force the risk 
into darker corners.
that  were  considered  mainstream  in  the 
past now look unattractive, because banks 
are being asked to hold much larger levels 
of capital and the pricing has not kept pace. 
The obvious answer is to ditch these func-
tions – which include small and medium-
sized  business  lending,  structured  credit 
and higher risk lending, trade and project 
finance – and focus on a narrower range of 
activities that still return a decent profit.
The  result  is  that  big  names  from  asset 
management  and  even  corporate  players 
are moving more heavily onto this territory 
– sometimes to make money, but also as a 
way of providing a full service to customers 
being shunned by the banks. Asset manag-
ers  in  the  mix  include  Blackstone,  whose 
credit arm GSO has become a major lender 
to sub-investment grade companies on both 
sides of the Atlantic, and Britain’s M&G In-
vestments, which launched a UK company-
financing  fund  back  in  2009  on  the  basis 
T
     The lessons we should take 
from the crisis are that regulation 
creates its own distortions and 
that, when it comes to the failure 
of key financial institutions, 
governments are likely  
to be on the hook
Into the 
                                          he best of many 
analogies for risk is that of someone lying 
down on a blown-up mattress or li-lo. The 
mattress changes shape as they move, but it 
still contains the same amount of air. Move 
and the air shifts again, but at no time does 
it  disappear  –  unless  the  weight  is  heavy 
enough to burst the mattress completely.
Risk in the financial system operates in simi-
lar fashion. Regulate or push down on one part 
of the system and the risk moves elsewhere – 
maybe, if you are unlucky, to a place where it 
is less controlled. If the weight on the financial 
system is too much there is the potential for a 
blow-out – hence the recent financial crisis.
In  fact,  the  root  cause  of  the  failure  of 
regulators and banks to anticipate the crisis 
was their inability to identify accurately the 
location of the risk in the system. The dan-
ger is that, by clamping down on banks and 
forcing  them  to  conform  to  extensive  and 
demanding regulations, regulators will shift 
the risk to other institutions. Thus there are 
real  grounds  for  concern  that  history  will 
repeat itself.
It seems unlikely that even the new breed 
of regulator – the so-called macro-prudential 
regulator, whose job is to look at the build-up 
of risks in the entire system – will pick this 
up. It is natural that regulators will be guard-
ing  against  a  new  banking  crisis,  but  they 
will  be  less  astute  when  it  comes  to  other 
forms of risk, such as asset managers taking 
on  banking  business  and  hitting  problems. 
This, however, is now a real possibility.
Banks are reassessing their business mod-
els in the light of the new regulations they 
face,  especially  Basel  III.  Many  activities 
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that, with the demise of Lehmans, the en-
tire financing model had changed.
BlackRock  –  which  split  from  Blackstone 
back  in  1994  and,  with  its  acquisition  of 
Barclays Global Investors, is now the largest 
money manager in the world – also saw its role 
evolve post-crash. CEO Larry Fink became the 
sage to whom other Wall Street bosses turned 
for advice and help. Consequently, BlackRock 
played a huge part in the bailout process and 
now oversees the $130 billion of toxic assets 
the US government inherited from AIG and 
Bear Stearns. It monitors the balance sheets 
of  US  housing  finance  vehicles  Fannie  Mae 
and Freddie Mac and has a critical role in the 
$1200bn Federal Reserve scheme to kickstart 
the US housing market.
The firm has also become a large corpo-
rate  lender.  It  recently  announced  that  it 
was moving into mid-market private equity, 
where it will invest directly into businesses. 
Advisory  arm  BlackRock  Solutions  assists 
clients  with  debt  restructuring  and  valua-
tions of structured credit portfolios – both 
businesses that banks like to take on.
On the corporate side, German engineer-
ing  group  Siemens,  which  has  long  had  a 
financial services division, set up banking 
operations  in  2010,  enabling  it  to  under-
take SME lending and project finance. Gen-
eral Electric and Rolls-Royce, equally, have 
long financed suppliers, but they are likely 
to  expand  this  role  as  the  banks  retreat.
Basel III is particularly harsh in its treat-
ment of trade finance. Thus for large corpo-
rations, with their global scope and finan-
cial muscle, this would be a natural area to 
move into. Purists may argue that this is just 
the  natural  operation  of  the  market,  with 
more  nimble  players  moving  in  to  exploit 
opportunities that less competitive institu-
tions can no longer exploit.
The problem with this analysis is that it 
sidesteps  the  fact  that  banking  has  never 
been  an  activity  ruled  entirely  by  market 
forces.  Even  before  the  crisis  it  was  heav-
ily regulated, which in itself led to perverse 
outcomes  such  as  the  huge  growth  in  off-
balance-sheet activities. Then, worst of all 
from a free market standpoint, banks that 
hit  trouble  were  rescued  by  governments 
and did not pay for their mistakes. The re-
sult is a massive moral hazard problem.
T
he  lessons we should take from 
the crisis are that regulation cre-
ates its own distortions and that, 
when it comes to the failure of key 
financial institutions, governments are likely 
to be on the hook. It was a failure to appreci-
ate this first point that led to regulators miss-
ing the build-up of risk in the system. Banks 
developed off-balance-sheet structures, such 
as securitisation of subprime mortgages and 
other receivables, as a way round the capi-
tal restrictions that would apply if they held 
these assets directly on their books.
Banks also got round the rules on capital 
by raising hybrid capital, which was accept-
ed  by  the  regulators  as  equity  but  treated 
by the markets as debt. When the crunch 
came, this hybrid capital did not have the 
loss-absorbing capacity of equity and banks 
were left undercapitalised.
On top of that, banks succeeded in divert-
ing regulators’ attention by inventing a phil-
osophical basis for the new modus operandi. 
It was called “originate and distribute”: the 
argument was that the originators of loans 
and mortgages distributed them around the 
system to the market participant best able 
to  cover  the  risk.  Risk  was  dispersed  and 
so it was less likely that an individual bank 
would get into trouble.
Ironically,  when  this  edifice  fell  apart 
(both  the  structures  and  the  ideology)  it 
was the supposedly safest part – the triple-
A  bonds  backed  by  subprime  mortgages 
– which came unstuck first. In this latest 
regulatory iteration, there is clearly a dan-
ger  that  the  mistakes  of  the  past  will  be 
repeated, because there is a belief that the 
risk is accounted for when in fact it has been 
hived off elsewhere – for example, to asset 
managers and corporates.
Regulators  may  also  be  deluding  them-
selves in thinking that if one of these firms 
hits trouble, market forces will function and 
the institution be allowed to fail, thereby re-
moving the moral hazard. This is to forget 
that by the time a non-bank gets into diffi-
culty, the build-up of risk will most likely be 
so large as to threaten extensive damage to 
the financial system and the real economy. 
Because that has happened, politicians will 
become involved and their concern will be 
in seeing that voters do not lose money. The 
fact that the firm in question is not a depos-
it-taker may be irrelevant by then.
Asset  managers  argue  that  part  of  their 
advantage in making long-term loans and in-
vestments is that their funds from investors 
are also long-term. This means that their as-
sets  and  liabilities  are  matched,  in  contrast 
to banks whose depositors can demand their 
cash back instantly. But if the new model takes 
off, how long will it be before the demand for 
funds is so great that short-term vehicles be-
come the preferred method of raising cash?
Regulators  are  busy  designing  a  system 
that they hope will allow banks to fail rather 
than be rescued by governments. This con-
sists  of  separating  out  retail  from  invest-
ment  banking  and  forcing  banks  to  write 
resolution plans, or “living wills”, detailing 
how they can restructure the business in a 
crisis without support and with minimum 
market  disruption.  Of  course,  no-one  can 
know if this will be successful until it is put 
to the test in a crisis. But, as with all the 
other regulatory initiatives, it does not apply 
to the shadow banking sector.
Regulators are at least discussing how to 
address  the  problem  of  shadow  banking. 
At  June’s  G20  meeting  of  world  leaders  in 
Mexico, the communiqué expressed support 
for the Financial Stability Board’s work “to 
strengthen  the  oversight  and  regulation  of 
the shadow banking system”. But this process 
is in its early stages and policy recommenda-
tions will not be developed until the end of 
2012.  Given  that  major  banking  regulation 
such as Basel III is being phased in over a 
six-year period to 2019, the time horizon on 
shadow  banking  may  end  up  going  out  to 
2030. By that time it may all be too late. 
Big names from asset 
management and even corporate 
players are moving onto this 
territory – sometimes because 
they see an opportunity to 
make money, but also as
a way of providing a 
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Measuring risk 
effectively is vital. 
But if the tools that 
are used to do so are 
inappropriate, the result 
may be a very accurate 
wrong answer – and, 
consequently, disaster, 
as with the current 
series of financial crises.
By BRandOn davIES
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t is often stated that it is impossible to manage 
what cannot be measured. It is indeed far easier to 
manage something if you can measure it – as I have 
had to do many times in a 40-year career in banking 
– though there is one major problem: you must be using an 
appropriate measure. Note the use of the word appropriate 
rather than accurate. If the measure is not appropriate, the 
result may turn out to be a very accurate wrong answer.
The appropriateness can be gauged by how well a meas-
ure does the job of describing the thing to be measured. So 
the key question is whether the current measures of risk live 
up to this standard. The answer is not immediately obvious. 
Many models of risk clearly did not work well in the current 
series of financial crises that seem to have become a per-
manent feature of the financial world since the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2007.
But does that point to problems with the measure, as well as 
with its application? There is an increasingly strong argument 
that this is the case, as our problems began when we started 
developing tools for managing risk. Some 20 years ago a slide 
(see chart p20) was used to explain to a major bank’s board 
committee some of the problems it was having with measuring 
risk. The slide focused firstly on the problems of describing an 
appropriate distribution of prices to fit the relatively sparse his-
toric data available in relation to the assets being measured. But 
it also covered different risk measures, as it showed the mean/ 
variance and expected shortfall as a measure of risk.
The reason for using two definitions was that bankers and 
regulators were uncertain how to define risk, but felt that the 
required measurement tool was dependent on the definition 
adopted. Risk was defined in two ways. Firstly, what is the 
maximum loss – within a given probability – that an institu-
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over a given time period? Or, secondly, what is the 
maximum loss that an institution could suffer as 
a result of holding the given asset portfolio over 
a given time period? The difference is subtle but 
very important – in essence, should risk be meas-
ured as an absolute number, or calculated while 
constraining the results within a certain probabil-
ity of outcome?
As time passed, banks became very confident 
about how to define risk, opting for the first of the 
two definitions, and they also decided to use value 
at risk (VaR) as the measure. VaR is a constrained 
measure – it looks at risk as variance measured 
at some percentile from the mean (average) out-
come. This constraint made for a very much more 
simple measure of risk than would have been the 
case if extreme outcomes were assessed.
However, in many ways this was the less in-
tellectually defensible of the two definitions and 
measurement  tools.  Anyone  who  defines  risk 
usually does so in terms of the worst possible out-
come. Yet banks decided to measure financial risk 
at some lesser point. The first reason for this ap-
proach is that the risk of financial loss is difficult 
to measure, even if it is a matter of assessing a rela-
tively simple portfolio of assets.
The  frequently  encountered  measurement 
problem was uncertainty over the shape of 
the distribution of bad outturns that occur 
in the tails of distributions (see chart). The 
data may fit a number of different distribu-
tions – and while it is possible to agree 
that these will have a fat tail, just how fat 
that tail will be depends on a number of 
assumptions about which data to use.
Secondly, bankers are really not in-
terested in the loss from a single asset 
or portfolio of similar assets. Their real concern 
is in the absolute maximum of losses that could 
be faced from holding the entire asset base. This 
means the interest is not in measuring from the 
mean to the chosen percentile, but rather from 
the furthest point of the distribution back to the 
chosen  percentile.  Measuring  risk  in  this  way 
is usually represented by the expected shortfall 
measure.
However,  once  large  and  complex  portfolios 
of assets have to be assessed, there is a very seri-
ous problem in looking at maximum losses. The 
losses are not additive – that is, they will depend 
not only on the losses of each portfolio of similar 
assets but also on the correlation between each 
portfolio.  This  is  called  dynamic  conditional 
correlation (DCC): it is a particular property of 
extreme outcomes in financial markets.
DCC  demonstrates  that  extremely  bad  out-
comes  can  be  much  more  likely  than  would 
be the case if the assumption were made that 
the  correlations  between  different  asset  port-
folios in the overall balance sheet were stable. 
It  also  shows  that  the  correlations  between 
individual asset portfolios change (are dynamic), 
and change differently, depending on circum-
stances (are conditional).
The tail risk ceases to be static and becomes 
dynamic. To put this statistically, we might find 
in  our  dynamic  world  that  a  seven-standard 
deviation event is almost inevitable given that 
a five-standard deviation event has happened, 
whereas looking at a static distribution in simi-
lar circumstances the seven-standard deviation 
event is still very unlikely.
There are challenges for those looking to use 
this  measurement  tool,  including  describing 
the event or events which trigger this dynamic 
correlation  process,  and  measuring  how  the 
correlations will change given a certain set of 
– often evolving – events. One such, which has 
been connected to DCC, is dramatic changes 
in the liquidity of markets known as liquidity 
black holes (see box). Recent events in interna-
tional markets do seem to validate that liquidity 
is an important factor in driving changes in as-
set portfolio correlations.
So it is necessary to find ways of measuring 
how correlations will change given a certain set 
of events. The first principle is that fat tails and 
DCC are related concepts, as they are the result 
of relationships between the observed param-
eters (say, losses or asset prices) that are not nor-
mally distributed. Characteristically, these non-
normal observations are recorded in the tails of 
distributions – which means they are character-
istic of extreme values.
Measuring these extreme values has taken on 
more importance in addressing a wide range of 
problems in finance, notably in credit, options 
pricing and risk modelling. It has become increas-
ingly understood that in all these areas many risk 
and pricing models assumed linearity of results, 
whereas that was not necessarily the case.
In credit, the example of both structural (Mer-
ton) and reduced-form (Jarrow) models produced 
theoretical  values  that  differed  from  those  ob-
served. In options, pricing the “smile” effect clear-
ly showed that there were effects on options pric-
es that did not conform directly to models based 
on completeness of markets and the application of 
arbitrage-free conditions.
To address these problems, there was a grow-
ing trend towards the use of copula mathemat-
ics – tools for modeling dependence of several 
a black hole in 
space is a region 
of powerful gravity 
surrounding a point of 
infinite density, called 
a singularity, formed 
from the collapse of a 
supernova. nothing, 
not even light, can 
escape after falling 
past the event horizon, 
the “edge” of the 
black hole. 
Liquidity black holes 
are not simply instances 
of large price changes 
– releases of important 
economic data are 
frequently accompanied 
by such changes, and 
are arguably a sign of 
the smooth functioning 
of the market as it 
adjusts rapidly to 
new (exogenous) 
information. Liquidity 
black holes appear as 
large price changes 
that seem to gather 
momentum from the 
endogenous response 
of market participants. 
Whilst the price 
falls may initially be 
generated by shocks 
from outside the 
price-setting system 
(exogenous events), they 
are reinforced by forces 
that come from within 
the price-setting system 
itself (endogenous 
events). endogenous 
risk appears where 
there is a conjunction of 
individuals reacting to 
their environment and 
where these reactions 
affect the environment.
How can market 
distress feed upon 
itself? When asset 
prices fall some dealers 
will suffer losses, at or 
close to their loss limits. 
This causes them to 
sell assets for fear of 
exceeding their limits, 
which in turn causes 
further rounds of selling 
as other dealers get 
close to their limits, 
creating a downward 
spiral in asset prices.
Portfolio insurance 
based on dynamic 
hedging rules is one 
well-known example 
of actions that can 
cause such feedback. 
However, any 
widespread sale of an 
asset class can cause a 
liquidity black hole.
Perhaps the best 
example came in 
the 2008 financial 
crisis that followed 
the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. 
The widespread 
fear that a number 
of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and 
other collateralised 
debt obligations (cDo) 
might suffer defaults in 
their underlying loan 
contracts far above 
those commensurate 
with their credit ratings 
resulted in just such 
feedback effects. as 
institutions sought to 
sell these securities, 
the result was (self-
defeating) feedback 
that led to the total 
drying-up of both the 
new issuance and 
secondary market for 
these securities.
one of the problems 
liquidity black holes 
create is that as asset 
markets dry up they 
can no longer price the 
assets in any rational 
way. This creates the 
need for regulatory 
intervention to restore 
an active market and 
efficient price discovery. 
in the 2008 crisis this 
took the form of the 
troubled asset relief 
programme (Tarp).
LIQUIDITY BLACK HOLES
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     While scenario analysis  
is intuitively appealing  
to many, it is no more than  
a “best guess” which is  
highly likely to be wrong as  
the future is not simply  
unknown – it is unknowable
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random variables – which could be used to look at 
the dynamics of the underlying asset (or assets). 
Technically, copulas enable bankers to express a 
joint probability distribution as a function of the 
marginal probability distributions. This means it 
is possible to bypass the problem of using corre-
lations, so it is an effective way to represent co-
movements between variables if they are linked 
by linear relationships – but not if the co-move-
ments are non-linear.
One of the most common uses of copula math-
ematics in finance was by rating agencies to price 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), including 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In the crisis 
that resulted from the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers, these models proved to have significantly un-
derestimated the joint default probabilities of the 
mortgage assets within the individual MBS.
The problem of these models lay in the choice of 
a Gaussian copula to replicate the marginal prob-
ability distributions. Whilst we commonly associ-
ate Gaussian distributions with randomness, this 
is  a  very  constrained  form  of  randomness  (see 
box), in that the Gaussian distribution is normal. 
In practice this proved disastrous, as the defaults 
proved to be very fat-tailed. Indeed, the default 
process appeared to feed upon itself as defaults 
mounted and the liquidity of markets dried up. 
So prices of MBS fell further as defaults mounted, 
the  correlations  between  the  defaulting  assets 
appeared to be both dynamic and conditional. This 
means that, in this case, the assumed correlations 
increased as the liquidity of markets decreased.
The lesson is that, while copulas offer a way 
of measuring non-linear relationships, they also 
present problems, as the choice of the copula is 
vital to the outcome. In practice, therefore, it is 
akin to the problem of the choice between using 
parametric or non-parametric distributions com-
mon in VaR-based market risk models.
If the choice is made to use a parametric dis-
tribution, the specific parametric distribution se-
lected will largely determine the outcome. In the 
case of copula choice, however, only a very limited 
number of copulas are usually considered for use 
in finance, not least because the outcomes can 
be very difficult to interpret. The use of copulas 
in measuring large portfolios of differing risks is 
thus in its infancy. While it is possible to under-
stand the issues produced by dynamic conditional 
correlation in banks’ asset portfolios, there is still 
a long way to go before it offers a reliable statistical 
methodology for measuring that risk.
Nonetheless,  it  is  necessary  to  have  some 
means of examining the implications of extreme 
outcomes. Creating scenarios is today the main 
methodology for this and has become embedded 
in  legislation  (for  example,  stress-tests).  While 
there is no statistical validity in creating scenarios 
– there is no way of accurately ascribing a statisti-
cal probability to any particular assumed scenario 
– they do have some benefits.
Scenarios have an intuitive meaning to senior 
executives, boards and regulators, because it is 
easy to see the thinking behind any particular sce-
nario and to modify any assumptions to fit a par-
ticular bank or economy (or both). They can be 
tailored to the risk profile and/or business model 
of the individual bank, which is particularly use-
ful when tying the scenario into the bank’s busi-
ness plan, individual capital adequacy assessment 
process (ICAAP) or individual liquidity adequacy 
assessment statement (ILAAS). They can also be 
bank-specific and/or system-wide, as regulators 
require for both the ICAAP and ILAAS.
Scenario  reports  can  also  be  extended  to 
show  how,  for  example,  a  bank’s  board  and 
management will react to specific risks thrown 
up by a scenario. In a similar way, they can also 
address  opportunities  that  may  arise  from  a 
specific scenario.
However,  the  core  problem  remains:  while 
there  are  two  definitions  of  risk  (measuring 
maximum loss excluding or including “within a 
given probability”), there is no really satisfactory 
methodology for measuring that risk. VaR is wide-
ly used to measure maximum loss within a given 
probability. But it is also a very incomplete meas-
ure as it fails totally to deal with the issue relating 
to the worst outcome.
Both regulators and regulated are increasingly 
focusing their energies on how to measure worst 
outcomes, but there are only a few insights (liquid-
ity black holes, dynamic conditional correlation, 
Cauchy randomness) to guide us in our choice of 
statistical tool (copulas have at best a chequered 
history in providing accurate answers).
chance, in general 
terms, means either the 
likelihood of winning 
or of losing at some 
game, or something 
less predictable like a 
chance meeting with an 
old friend. on a more 
specific question such 
as investment, it means 
the chance of making or 
losing money. 
But surely when 
we look at the shares 
in a company or 
the movement of an 
exchange rate, these 
events have underlying 
causes. So how can 
we say they are the 
result of chance?
There are two distinct 
ways to describe events 
that have causation. 
one is to look for cause 
and effect, but this 
may be very difficult, 
as the trail of causality 
may be both complex 
and extensive and we 
cannot know everything 
about the subject.
another option is to 
look at outcomes (effects) 
as if they were the result 
of a process that cannot 
be fully understood, 
and about which it is 
only possible to observe 
some inputs and thus 
infer how the process 
may work. This is known 
as the “stochastic” way 
of viewing the world.
it is particularly 
useful in finance, as 
the inputs may be of 
dubious quality and their 
links to the outcomes 
may change over time 
or given changes in 
circumstance. Share 
purchases and sales 
transactions, for example, 
can be observed and 
connected to a price 
chart. connecting 
these inputs and 
effects by assuming 
they are connected 
by a random 
process 
delivers an 
ability to predict 
outcomes.
But what, then, is 
the random process? 
it is here that the 
mathematicians come 
into play, as it can be 
shown that repeating 
a random experiment 
often enough will result 
in the average of the 
outcomes converging 
to an expected value. 
This observation has 
become the basis for 
much of finance theory, 
as it allows analysts 
to assume that the 
random process can be 
described by a normal 
distribution.
This finding – and the 
thought processes and 
mathematics behind 
it – is most frequently 
associated with a 
mathematician 
named 
(Johann) carl Friedrich 
Gauss, hence Gaussian 
when describing 
its application. The 
powerful properties of 
normal distributions can 
be used to describe 
randomness in finance. 
But that is far from the 
whole story, because 
there is another form of 
randomness.
augustin-Louis cauchy, 
a French mathematician, 
developed a rather 
different approach, 
one described as the 
“blindfolded archer” 
theory. in other words, 
if not told where the 
target was, a blindfolded 
archer would shoot 
arrows in all directions. 
There is no reason 
to believe that the 
shots would follow 
a normal distribution 
where most shots would 
be near the target and 
any miss would only 
move the average 
deviation a small amount 
[errors converge to the 
mean and variance is 
predictable]. But with 
a blindfolded archer, 
each additional shot 
could cause the average 
deviation to move very 
considerably [the errors 
have infinite expectation 
and lead to infinite 
variance].
These two views 
of randomness fit two 
very different states of 
the world. in the first, 
change happens through 
the cumulative effect of 
small changes in the 
way the world works 
over relatively long 
periods of time. in the 
second, single large 
events can bring about 
major change in very 
short periods of time and 
the possibility of other 
world-changing events 
looms large.
The challenge for 
bankers and regulators 
is to decide which 
scenario best describes 
the current state of 
the world. Before 
they decide on their 
approach, they have 
to take into account 
the fact that there is no 
cauchy distribution, let 
alone a cauchy copula. 
in a cauchy world, life 
is very unpredictable.
CHANCE AND RANDOMNESS
For measuring maximum loss excluding “with-
in a given probability”, the only option is scenario 
analysis.  While  this  is  intuitively  appealing  to 
many, it is no more than a “best guess” which is 
highly likely to turn out to be the wrong guess as 
the future is not simply unknown – it is unknow-
able.  Therefore  financial  institutions  and  their 
regulators are left with no choice but to adopt 
processes and procedures which make it possible 
to manage in the most effective way what can-
not be measured. The day the practical banker is 
replaced by the quantitative analyst is further off 
than we once thought. 
     While it is possible to 
understand the issues produced 
by dynamic conditional 
correlation in banks’ asset 
portfolios, there is still a long 
way to go before it offers a 
reliable statistical methodology 
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Banking regulation is 
essentially a national 
issue. Governments set 
up regulatory authorities 
to supervise their banks 
and write their own rules 
to prevent banks under 
their jurisdiction getting 
into difficulties. But since 
1988 the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 
established under the 
auspices of the Bank for 
International Settlements – 
the central bankers’ bank 
– has issued accords with 
the aim of establishing 
a global standard for 
the amounts of capital 
banks should hold against 
different types of credit.
Over the years, most 
major countries have 
decided to adopt Basel’s 
policy recommendations, 
although they do tend to 
modify them according to 
their own circumstances. The 
main exception is the United 
States, which has often 
preferred to follow its own 
star on financial regulation 
and is currently introducing 
the comprehensive Dodd-
Frank Act, which may not 
sit comfortably with Basel 
guidelines. In the European 
Union, the regulations 
are implemented through 
the Capital Requirements 
Directive, or CRD4.
At its core, Basel deals 
with the amount of capital 
banks should be required 
to hold in relation to their 
assets, the quality of the 
capital and the assets, 
and bank liquidity. In each 
new version of Basel, the 
regulatory net is spread 
wider, with the aim of 
bringing more aspects of 
banking under control. 
Whether the result is a safer 
system is arguable.
In response to the financial 
crisis, the Basel Committee 
rushed out what it called 
its 2.5 version – a sort of 
halfway house between 
Basel II and III – to deal with 
the immediate problems 
arising out of securitisations 
and risks in the trading 
book. Basel III followed in 
December 2010, the most 
comprehensive version to 
date, with an implementation 
period starting from 1 
January 2013 and a 
completion date of 2019.
However, many banks 
and jurisdictions were at that 
point still struggling to get to 
grips with Basel II, published 
in June 2004 and with a 
Brian Caplen examines the 
development of international 
regulation of banking risk  
brokered by the Basel Committee  
on Banking Supervision.
capital. The capital released 
can back new loans and they 
can make larger profits.
To try and counter this 
gaming of the regulations, 
Basel III has gone back to 
a very old idea – that of 
a leverage or capital-to-
asset ratio. Under the new 
rules, if all the risk-weight 
advantages are removed, a 
bank’s total capital must still 
come to 3 per cent of total 
assets. This means the bank 
is leveraged 33 times (100 
per cent of assets divided by 
3 per cent of capital) – still 
quite high, but less than 
the 50 times some banks 
reached going into the crisis. 
The other major part of 
Basel III deals with liquidity 
and funding. A new liquidity 
coverage ratio determines 
that banks must have 
sufficient assets they can 
sell quickly to raise funds 
in times of stress. There is a 
debate, however, around the 
types of assets that should 
be held. Sovereign debt 
should be the most easily 
tradable and liquid asset, 
but the eurozone crisis has 
prompted questions about 
its safety. On the funding 
side, the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) restricts reliance 
on short-term funding. But it 
runs counter to the general 
purpose of banks, which is 
exactly that – to borrow short 
and lend long, known as 
maturity transformation.
In the wake of the crisis, 
the Basel Committee 
has become very active 
and has started issuing 
papers on every aspect 
of banking. In the last few 
months there have been 
consultative documents on 
risk-data aggregation and on 
monitoring intraday liquidity. 
Another report looks at the 
internal audit function in 
banks. Whether Basel – in 
conjunction with the many 
other regulatory initiatives 
being enacted around the 
globe – leads to a safer 
financial system is a moot 
point. There may be ways 
in which banks can game 
the system that have not yet 
been catered for, or the risk 
may be disappearing to the 
shadow banks. 
     Whether Basel – in 
conjunction with the 
many other regulatory 
initiatives being enacted 
around the globe – leads
 to a safer financial 
system is a moot point
The Basel line
target implementation date 
of end of 2006. Whereas 
Basel I had been a very 
granular system based on 
strict percentages of capital 
related to a rough and ready 
measure of the riskiness of 
the assets, Basel II attempted 
something much more 
complex, and allowed large 
international banks to do 
their own calibrations of the 
capital needed.
With those banks losing 
their reputation for good risk 
management in the crisis, 
Basel III combines some of 
the standard elements of 
Basel I with very detailed 
prescriptions in the areas of 
liquidity and capital. The aim 
is that banks should hold 4.5 
per cent of the highest quality 
capital (equity and reserves, 
known as Tier 1 capital) 
against risk-weighted assets 
by 2019. On top of this, it 
proposes a 2.5 per cent 
capital conservation buffer, 
designed to be built up in 
good times for use in bad 
times, making a total capital 
requirement of 7 per cent.
The key phrase in here is 
risk-weighted assets. What 
the Basel system does is 
lay down guidelines for 
the amounts of capital that 
need to be held against 
assets with different risks 
attached. Sovereign debt 
is usually considered risk 
free (although the eurozone 
crisis is planting doubts) 
and so is zero-rated – which 
means banks do not need to 
hold capital against loans 
to governments. Assets at 
the other end of the risk 
spectrum attract a 100 per 
cent weighting, which means 
that a full 7 per cent of the 
loan must be held as capital 
under Basel III.
It doesn’t take a genius 
to see how banks could 
play around with these 
risk-weightings to their 
advantage. If they can 
classify loans as closer to 
zero than 100 per cent, they 
end up needing to hold less 
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  B
anks are today heavily committed to 
leveraging the opportunities that “big 
data” – data sets so large and complex 
that  they  become  awkward  to  work 
with using traditional database management tools 
– and business analytics present. So they invest 
billions of dollars every year in technology to store 
and analyse, mine and manipulate information.
Indeed, Capital One, a Fortune 500 bank, has 
become the foremost example of the creed of “com-
peting on analytics”. Every day millions of individu-
als’ credit scores are used to check in real time the 
creditworthiness of credit-card holders and spot 
anomalous transactions that may suggest fraud. 
Complex modelling is at the heart of pricing illiq-
uid sophisticated financial instruments, while high 
Incredibly complex and detailed information on 
individuals and companies is now freely obtainable 
thanks to technological advances. Analytics –  
the analysis of data to fine-tune decision-making –  
is becoming a key element of banking strategy.
Deciphering   
the dataANALYTICS
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street banks can now experiment with new offers, 
tying in the profitable and freezing out the unprof-
itable customer.
But  while  business  analytics  and  big  data 
have proved a boon to both investment and re-
tail bankers – enabling IT suppliers, algorithm-
savvy “quants” plus a whole new breed of data 
scientists to prosper – the science has some way 
to go before it becomes a panacea for all the 
financial sector’s problems.
Some difficulties are practical. Large financial 
services firms are already struggling to manage 
their huge data stores (up to a petabyte: a unit equal 
to ten to the 15th – 10 followed by 15 zeros – bytes) 
in a way that satisfies existing regulatory require-
ments;  how  will  they  cope  with  the  additional 
demands for transparency from regulators? Other 
issues relate to governance. How does the chief 
executive (let alone the board) provide oversight 
of  what  are  fiendishly  complex  technology  and 
statistical operations? Finally, there is the overrid-
ing question: should banks’ senior executives really 
abandon their gut instincts and opt for a fully data-
driven strategy?
The reason for the rise of the new information 
technology is evident enough. The cost of storing 
data has been falling even faster than the costs 
of  digital  processing  power,  and  modelling  has 
got faster and more sophisticated. The result is a 
step-change in the power of data-mining and data-
analysis. With so much of retail banking moving 
online, data in vast quantities is collected automati-
cally with every click and is there to be analysed. 
Companies could get rich simply analysing the data 
they already have.
Financial services organisations are not simply 
doing the old things better, they have the oppor-
tunity to do quite new things. Self-learning algo-
rithms can spot profitable opportunities. New ways 
of optimising pricing and presenting data (so-called 
visualisation) are making life easier. 
Yet at the same time as business has been dis-
rupted by new information systems, the techniques 
all too often remain the proprietary knowledge of a 
narrow group of specialists. Who among the senior 
executives really understands Hadoop (see box), 
Olap (online analytical processing, which enables 
end-users to analyse data extremely quickly), data-
warehousing, and so on? The higher echelons of 
the banks are right to feel a little daunted.
In truth, the concepts of big data and business 
analytics  are  only  loosely  defined.  Big  data  de-
scribes the growth in the quantity of data to a point 
where conventional tools, such as the Excel spread-
sheet, are no longer capable of handling it. The 
trend to big data is being driven in part by the sheer 
scale of data now collected at point of sale, online, 
in social media and so on.
Business analytics, a close cousin of big data, is 
the methodical exploration of data to spot hitherto 
unsuspected patterns and associations that can be 
turned into so-called actionable insights, that is in-
sights that can be used to frame decisions and to 
automate and optimise business processes.
Modelling also allows so-called “predictive ana-
lytics”. The vastness of the data makes it possible to 
identify strong correlations that will hold for future 
customer behaviours. One major US credit card 
issuer, for example, found that those customers 
who made regular trips to the dentist tended to pay 
off their bills more reliably. Analytics also makes 
it possible to run “what if” scenarios – how many 
profitable savings customers will you lose if, for 
example, the withdrawal notice period is extended 
from one month to three?
It is hardly new to say that banks are awash with 
data. But in practice it is no easy task to distil in-
sights from data that are strong enough on which 
to base decisions. Most financial institutions have 
multiple data sets and systems that are not straight-
forward to correlate. Metrics will have been col-
lected in different ways, over different periods, with 
different levels of accuracy. Is the “Larry Zhang” in 
one data base the same as the “L Zhang” with the 
same date of birth but living in a different country 
four years later in another?
In an ideal data-driven business, all information 
would be comparable and collected in a standard 
way in all parts of the enterprise. The reality is that 
organisations are built around silos, each of which 
proliferates and jealously guards its own informa-
tion. Hence what should be simple opportunities to 
cross-sell may be missed, and attempts to build up a 
picture of a customer in terms of their preferences 
     With so much of retail 
banking moving online, 
data in vast quantities is 
collected automatically with 
every click and is there to be 
analysed. Companies could 
get rich simply analysing  
the data they already have
Big credit card companies and others 
are very interested in Hadoop, one 
of the new set of tools to help handle 
big data. Hadoop is an open source 
software framework that enables 
applications to work with thousands 
of computational independent 
computers and petabytes of data. 
It is emerging as one of the most 
significant frameworks for dealing 
with the challenges of data-deluge 
– storing, processing, indexing, and 
analysing large amounts of data. 
Relational database systems are good 
at data-retrieval and queries but don’t 
accept new data. Hadoop and other 
tools get around this and allow data 
ingestion at incredibly fast rates.
HADOOP – THE NUMBER CRUNCHERANALYTICS
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for, say, free vouchers rather than a high rate of 
interest are stymied.
According to Jiake Brownbill, a business analyst 
in banking, “banking functions in a rarefied atmos-
phere where employees rarely have the opportunity 
to appreciate the full scope of the business. Com-
munication between workers is restricted as each 
individual is isolated in their silo and consumed 
with their own priorities. Quality and time issues 
often mean employees are under intensive pressure 
to provide quick management information to meet 
deadlines.  Unfortunately,  this  impinges  on  the 
time available to complete comprehensive analysis 
and acquire progressive business insight. This be-
comes a secondary priority.”
Still, a whole industry has sprung up to tackle 
this: data-mining, data-warehousing, data-cleans-
ing and so on are all specialisms in their own right. 
Many of those involved now call themselves data 
scientists,  though  this  is  also  fertile  terrain  for 
management  accountants  who  routinely  handle 
internal reporting. Of course, it is also the field of 
quants, who bring highly sophisticated modelling 
techniques drawn from academic disciplines, nota-
bly PhD-level physics.
Few companies in any sector at the moment (with 
the exception possibly of some start-ups) have the ca-
pability to run their strategy on data. To some extent 
the task facing banks is simply the task faced by all 
companies – they need to get better at analytics as 
the rise of social media and use of apps is converting 
more and more corporates (even coffee store chains 
such as Starbucks) into “tech companies”.
But in other respects banking is distinctly dif-
ferent. Take governance. Banks are institutions 
that rely extraordinarily heavily on analysis of risk 
and mathematical models. So how are the chief 
executive and board to judge whether the famous 
Black-Scholes mathematical model used to price 
some derivatives is robust? Could the executives 
at the top of a bank understand, let alone out-ar-
gue, a quant specialist with a PhD in inverse Gaus-
sian statistical distribution?
The strictness and demands of the regulatory 
framework are another differentiator. Regulators 
typically talk to large banks on a weekly basis to 
ensure their liquidity position is satisfactory. Busi-
ness analytics is good news, since it is accompanied 
with the growth in dashboards and other report-
ing tools which make it quick and easy to present 
robust data to regulators. Equally importantly, the 
new spirit of data-driven decision-making is creat-
ing a more transparent environment where regula-
tors can more easily pick out instances of a rogue 
trader’s activity.
Yet regulators’ demand for ever-greater transpar-
ency poses fresh burdens. So-called unstructured 
data  –  the  mountains  of  information  in  phone 
calls, emails and so forth – now have to be sifted 
for salient comments when things go wrong. New 
legislation is also taking its toll. One example is the 
Dodd-Frank Act. A federal statute in the United 
States signed into law in 2010, the Act brings in 
sweeping changes affecting almost every aspect of 
the nation’s financial services industry. Support for 
new regulations will force firms not only to acquire 
more granular data for enterprise risk management 
but  also  to  provide  increased  transparency  into 
their data. Financial institutions will be spending 
billions of dollars to strengthen, streamline and au-
tomate their record-keeping, risk management key 
performance indicators and dashboards.
As Ravi Kalakota, a partner at professional serv-
ices firm LiquidHub in New York, argues: “It won’t 
be easy for leadership to change existing financial 
institutions. To go from calcified corporate cultures 
that result in business units hoarding their own in-
formation in silos into one that embraces risk man-
agement, transparency, and governance as a collec-
tive cause is not going to be easy or painless.” 
A Fortune 500 bank, Capital One runs about 
three hundred experiments a day to improve 
its ability to target individual customers. These 
tests provide a relatively low-cost way for the 
company to judge how successful products 
and programmes would be before engaging 
in full-scale marketing. In its savings business, 
Capital One found that its experiments in terms 
of CD interest rates, rollover incentives and 
minimum balances had very predictable effects 
on retention rates and new money coming into 
the bank. Through such analyses, the savings 
business increased retention by 87 per cent 
and lowered the cost of acquiring by 83 per 
cent. “Few companies are set up to apply the 
principles of this test-and-learn approach, but 
Capital One’s entire distinctive capability is built 
on it,” say Thomas Davenport and Jeanne Harris 
in their book Competing on 
Analytics (Harvard Business 
School).
FINE-TUNED BANKING
In 2010 the law governing UK building societies 
changed. Nationwide, one of these mortgage-
lending mutuals, was required by its regulators 
to reduce the time it takes to transfer tax-free 
individual savings accounts (ISAs) between 
providers from 23 to 15 working days. Failure to 
do so could result in fines. The system involved 
moving three million pieces of paper annually 
between more than 700 branches.
A new digitised system was introduced 
allowing managers to focus on the flow of cases, 
both internally and with other ISA providers. The 
new analytics get information to people who 
can address it in near real time, as opposed to 
waiting for monthly reports after the complaints 
have been filed. Managers can drill down to 
individual cases that are stuck in the pipeline and 
transfer them to more experienced staff or chase 
the other ISA provider.
Nationwide says it has moved from 
retrospective investigation to forward-looking 
management. Most important of all, rather 
than have to explain delay to the regulator, 
the company can ensure – by monitoring the 
analytics on a daily basis – that it not only meets 
its deadlines, but can also prove it.
SPEEDING UP THE SYSTEM
     The new spirit of data-driven 
decision-making is creating a 
more transparent environment 
where regulators can pick  
out rogue trading more easilyECONOMIC COMMENTARY
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As gloom continues to envelop the global economy and 
fears grow for 2013, opinions differ over when and  
how growth will begin to accelerate again. What are  
the prospects for light at the end of the tunnel?
  T
his should be a time of optimism 
for the world economy. Global recov-
eries,  even  those  that  take  a  while 
to  get  going,  are  normally  in  full 
swing at this stage in the cycle, as they were 
in both the “roaring” 1990s and the 2000s. So 
policymakers would by now typically be more 
worried about how to prevent recoveries from 
getting out of hand and generating inflation-
ary pressures than struggling to invent ways to 
avoid a drift into stagnation.
But, as we move into the busy autumn season 
for international meetings dominated by fears 
for 2013, influential voices warn not of over-
exuberance but of downside risks. This was not 
how it was meant to be for the global economy. 
No one has spelt out the growing alarm about 
the next year more starkly than Christine La-
garde, the International Monetary Fund’s man-
aging director. In a recent speech she noted: “In 
today’s interconnected world, we can no longer 
afford to look only at what goes on within our 
national borders. This crisis does not recognise 
borders. This crisis is knocking at all our doors. 
There are risks in all corners of the globe – Eu-
rope, the United States and in Asia and Japan.”
The  numbers  tell  their  own  story.  Global 
growth  peaked  early  in  the  recovery,  world 
growth in both 2012 and 2013, which is a far 
cry from the 7.5 per cent of two years ago.
Some analysts are even gloomier. Not for the 
first time, one of the most pessimistic is Nou-
riel Roubini, of Roubini Global Economics. He 
argues that the world is heading for what 
he describes as “a global perfect storm” in 
2013.  “Financial  and  economic  clouds 
are,  it  seems,  rolling  in  from  every 
direction:  the  eurozone,  the  United 
States,  China,  and  elsewhere,”  he 
says. “Indeed, the global economy 
in 2013 could be a very difficult 
environment  in  which  to  find 
shelter.
“The eurozone crisis is wors-
ening … and capital flight could 
turn into a full run on periphery 
banks.  US  economic  perform-
ance is weakening … so the US 
may reach stall speed by year-
end. Worse, the risk of a double-
dip recession next year is rising. 
China – its growth model unsus-
tainable – could be underwater by 
2013, as its investment bust contin-
ues, and reforms intended to boost 
consumption are too little too late.”
Will “Dr Doom” be right, or are we 
in danger of talking ourselves into a new 
downturn? Economists at BNP Paribas, 
like those at the IMF, expect a stronger   
global picture in 2013, led by emerging 
gross domestic product rising by 5.3 
per  cent  in  2010,  one  of  only  three 
years in the past three decades in which 
a figure of more than 5 per cent has been 
posted. If 2011 was respectable, with a 
growth rate of 3.9 per cent, 2012 has been 
a much more challenging year, with growth 
slowing to 3.5 per cent.
Everyone  is  familiar  with  the  pattern  of 
global growth: strong in the emerging world, 
much weaker in the crisis-damaged West. In 
the West, in particular, one of the most ob-
vious  consequences  is  high  unemployment, 
which reached 48 million in the OECD in the 
summer and is on course to reach 50 million. 
Angel  Gurria,  the  OECD  secretary-general, 
argues: “It is imperative that governments use 
every possible means at their disposal to help 
jobseekers,  especially  young  people,  by  re-
moving barriers to job creation and investing 
in their education and skills. The young are at 
most risk of long-term damage to their careers 
and livelihoods.”
What is new, according to the leading in-
ternational  economic  organisations,  is  that 
the  slowdown  is  affecting  the  non-OECD 
world in a significant way. The IMF, for ex-
ample,  sees  sub-6  per  cent  emerging-world 
This crisis does not   
recognise borders. This crisis   
is knocking at all our doors.   
There are risks in all corners of 
the globe – Europe, the United 
States and in Asia and Japan
Sitting
  chilly
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economies. In the bank’s Third Quarter Global 
Outlook, it sees emerging economies leading 
the world into more robust growth. “We be-
lieve China is at, or close to, the turning point 
in its cycle, and expect growth of 8.7 per cent 
next year, up from 8 per cent this year,” says the 
bank’s Michal Dybula.
BNP  Paribas  has  two  alternatives  to  its 
main forecast. One, on which it places a 25 
per cent probability, is a disorderly eurozone 
break-up. The other, which it estimates as a 5 
per cent probability, is a disruption in global 
oil supplies. “In a worst-case scenario, ten-
sions with Iran could lead to a disruption of 
Middle East oil supply, such as the closure of 
the Strait of Hormuz,” the bank says. “Un-
der a scenario in which the disruption lasted 
some time, we believe the oil price could ini-
tially jump 50 per cent. Such a spike would 
immediately push up headline inflation glo-
bally,  hurting  fragile  consumer  demand  in 
developed economies and cutting manufac-
turing output everywhere.”
Though it believes any such effect would be 
short-lived, the bank’s analysis provides a re-
minder that there are other threats to the glo-
bal economy than the eurozone. They include 
disappointing  growth  in  America,  together 
with the threat of an impending “fiscal cliff”, 
as  automatic  deficit  reduction  measures  kick 
in. Even in the eurozone and America, how-
ever, some see tentative reasons for optimism. 
Joachim  Fels,  global  economist  at  Morgan 
Stanley,  argues:  “lnternal  rebalancing  in  the 
US and in Europe is under way, providing some 
light at the end of the tunnel. Over time, the US 
will likely experience a manufacturing and ex-
port revival thanks to a competitive currency, 
modest labour cost developments, and cheap 
new domestic sources of energy.”
What will it be? I would still subscribe to the 
view that the big shock for the world economy 
was in 2008-9, and that what we are seeing 
now are the aftershocks rather than the start 
of a whole new crisis. But, as any geologist will 
tell you, when it comes to earthquakes, the 
aftershocks can be more devastating than the 
original event. Fears are centred on the euro-
zone, and the question of whether policymak-
ers have the tools – and the vision – to solve 
a formidable problem, which has its roots in 
three linked crises.
Those crises – the growth and competitive-
ness crisis for peripheral economies, a continu-
ing banking crisis and a eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis – will take years to resolve. The question 
for the next 12-18 months is whether policymak-
ers can establish a credible direction of travel. At 
times they have appeared to be on the verge of 
doing so, at others as far away as ever.
Some of the other worries appear to be over-
stated. Anything is possible in Washington, but 
it is unlikely that US policymakers will be so 
locked in ideological stalemate that they will 
allow the “fiscal cliff” of forced tax hikes and 
spending cuts to jeopardise the rescue of the 
economy. As for China and the other emerg-
ing economies, it remains likely that we are 
witnessing a response to an earlier policy-tight-
ening in response to inflationary pressure, plus 
some  loss  of  export  growth  to  the  advanced 
economies,  rather  than  a  more  fundamental 
shift. The Chinese authorities have already re-
sponded by relaxing monetary policy.
It is possible, nonetheless, to be concerned 
about short-term prospects, as bodies such as 
the IMF are, while remaining optimistic about 
the longer term. Certainly, there are plenty 
of reasons to believe that the world economy 
will  regain  momentum  at  some  stage,  from 
the forces of technology, the search for new 
sources of energy and the rise of the BRICs 
and  other  emerging  economies.  For  policy-
makers, and for businesses, the challenge is 
how to negotiate the tricky short term to get 
to those better times. 
It is unlikely that US 
policymakers will allow the 
“fiscal cliff” of forced tax 
hikes and spending cuts
to jeopardise the rescue 
of the economy
The iMF’s most recent 
forecast, ahead of the 
update it will provide 
for an important set 
of autumn meetings, 
was for 3.5 per cent 
global growth for 2012, 
accelerating slightly to 
3.9 per cent in 2013. 
“More worrisome than 
revisions to the baseline 
forecast is the increase 
in downside risks,” said 
olivier Blanchard, the 
iMF’s chief economist. 
“Simply put, the euro 
periphery countries have 
to succeed.”
The iMF’s figures 
show, unsurprisingly, 
that eastern europe and 
the former Soviet Union 
have been hardest 
hit. Developing asia, 
including china and 
india, is still expanding 
at a 7 per cent-plus rate, 
and 2012 has been 
a good year for the 
Middle east and north 
africa, with 5.5 per cent 
growth – but, if the iMF 
is right, that will slow to 
a little below 4 per cent 
in 2013.
it adds: “These 
forecasts are predicated 
on two important 
assumptions: that 
there will be sufficient 
policy action to allow 
financial conditions in 
the euro area periphery 
to ease gradually, 
and that recent policy 
easing in emerging 
market economies 
will gain traction. 
clearly, downside risks 
continue to loom large, 
importantly reflecting 
risks of delayed or 
insufficient policy action.”
World trade, which 
grew by 12.8% in 2010, 
slowed to 5.9% in 2011 
and is expected to grow 
by a very modest 3.8% 
in 2012, followed by 
5.1% in 2013.
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he starting point for any 
examination of the lessons that 
the advanced economies can 
learn from Japan’s “two lost 
decades” must be an acknowl-
edgment that, whatever the similarities in the 
economic positions, in terms of culture, atti-
tudes and expectations, Japan is very different 
from anywhere in Europe or the United States.
These differences have been a strength 
and a burden for Japan. It was very slow 
to recognise the depth of the crisis and 
slow to react but, throughout, the general 
public has maintained discipline and been 
very cautious with household budgets. 
To find anything like the same thrift in 
the West, it is necessary to go back the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. Nor is that 
the general American approach, which is 
invariably optimistic. Certainly there is 
some stress in the national psyche at the 
moment, but Americans do not react in the 
same way as the Japanese.
Of course, one of the reasons why the 
Japanese policy response has been so 
conservative is that the country is trapped 
by its huge deficit, currently around 200 per 
cent of GDP. If the economy ever grew too 
strongly, or inflation rose above 2 per cent, 
their interest payments would rise sharply, 
which would aggravate the deficit more than 
economic growth would help it. That is the 
crux of Japan’s dilemma and explains much 
about how the Japanese government and 
the Japanese Central Bank have conducted 
economic and monetary policy.
The rise in US debt now means that the 
American government faces very similar 
constraints. The boom years look to be 
over, and are unlikely to return for a very 
long time. One significant economic 
measure that needs to be considered is 
the Nairu (non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment), which measures 
the relationship between unemployment 
and inflation. As the economy moves 
into a growth phase and more jobs are 
created, unemployment goes down and 
inflation starts to rise. But US economists 
are starting to realise that, even with a 
large unemployed base, there can still be 
inflation if China’s growth accelerates. This 
means the level of Nairu at which inflation 
starts to rise is a function not just of the US 
                   Governments may seek global lessons  
from Japan’s economic meltdown, but, says John Vail, 
                   differences in culture, attitude and 
circumstances mean that Europe and the United States  
                   are unlikely to face identical problems.
Red for 
    danger
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economy but of its interaction with other 
major economies. So the critical level of 
Nairu depends on global growth.
Experience over the past few years 
certainly shows that inflation can be 
high in the US and Europe even though 
unemployment is high – and this does not 
seem likely to change unless global growth 
turns negative. Add in other factors, notably 
the monetisation of US and European debt, 
and it is possible to suggest that deflation – 
or zero inflation, which is part of what has 
characterised the Japanese situation – will 
not take hold in the same way.
In the short term it might look as if the West 
is “going Japanese”, but the intermediate to 
longer-term view suggests not. Actually, the 
consumer price index in Japan has hovered 
around zero for a very long time. This can be 
called “no-flation” rather than deflation. It 
is extremely difficult to imagine the US 
tolerating “no-flation” for very long. The 
chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben 
Bernanke, would make sure that this 
did not happen.
There are other reasons, too, why 
Europe and the US are unlikely to 
face the same problems as Japan. 
The central banks on both sides 
of the Atlantic have done a very 
reasonable job of pulling their 
respective economies out of 
a complete tailspin by acting 
very quickly. Some people, of 
course, argue that everything 
should have been allowed to 
“take its natural course”, which 
would have cleared out “mal-
investment” and led to a faster 
recovery. But the majority view 
is that these central banks did 
a good job. The same cannot be 
said for the Bank of Japan in the 
years after the stock market and 
Japanese equities have 
been through a tremendous 
de-rating since the country’s 
economic bubble burst. At the 
peak, Japanese equities were 
on a multiple of 70 to 80 
times earnings, a figure never 
achieved by the US. This 
means that Japanese equities 
are now about as cheap as 
they are likely to get. Earnings 
multiples are now down to 
around 12 times earnings, 
which means that they are 
approximately a fifth of what 
they used to be.
Moreover, earnings 
multiples are not falling 
simply because of lower stock 
prices; the average earnings 
of all non-financial stocks 
just before the 2008 global 
financial crash were 50 per 
cent higher than at the top of 
the market in 1989. By the first 
quarter of 2011, this average 
figure had risen to 30 per 
cent higher than in 1989. 
So valuations are now very 
acceptable, even if Japanese 
JAPAN’S CORPORATIONS AND MARKETS
stocks may not look overly 
attractive when compared 
to global stocks in general. 
Obviously, the crises of 2011 
impacted earnings, but Japan 
is now bouncing back.
A common criticism 
of Japanese companies 
concerns the standard of 
corporate governance, with 
some recent scandals making 
the point. However, the 
US and Europe, too, have 
corporate governance issues, 
not the least of them being 
executive pay and bonuses at 
US and European banks. In 
defence of Japanese firms, it 
is extremely rare for them to 
have accounting problems or 
to be forced to restate their 
accounts – something one 
sees many examples of in US 
listed companies.
Another criticism is that 
Japanese companies hold too 
much cash and do not return 
enough of it to shareholders. 
There are companies in Japan 
that are world class in this 
respect, while there are also 
some who do not have a 
high reputation. Japan does 
have a profit motive, but it is 
a disciplined and tempered 
one, due to a feeling of social 
cohesion, and the dominance 
of the Japanese middle class 
– and middle-class values – 
remains strong.
The dominant set of 
attitudes lends itself to the 
long view, so local investors 
are not too begrudging about 
companies retaining cash for 
investment. Sometimes this is 
abused, but there are now 
share buybacks in Japan, 
which, of course, improves the 
position of anyone owning 
stock, since their holding is 
thus that bit less diluted.
There has also been a 
tremendous improvement, 
dating back to around 2005, 
in the willingness of major 
Japanese companies to 
return value to shareholders. 
There are some outstanding 
examples of this, and the 
dividend payout ratio in 
Japan is equivalent to that 
in the US. Share buybacks 
are not at US levels, but the 
fact that in the US they are 
inflated by the buybacks of 
share options to management 
has to be taken into account.
      The strong yen has 
been a big deflationary 
factor for Japan, which 
accumulated very large 
net investment positions 
in terms of ownership  
of overseas assets.
property market crash. It was very slow to 
react and, when it did, it vacillated between 
tightening and loosening.
In addition, the strong yen has been a 
big deflationary factor for Japan, which 
accumulated very large net investment positions 
in terms of ownership of overseas assets. 
Returning revenue flows from those assets 
led to large current account surpluses and the 
inflow of capital into Japan, a very different 
situation to that which faced the West.
But arguably the most important 
distinction between Japan and the western 
economies is that the latter have noted the 
problems faced by Japan because it built up 
such high levels of debt. Now approaching 
200 per cent of GDP, it is unsustainable 
at present levels and needs to be reduced 
to manageable proportions. In this sense, 
Japan is a huge warning flag for Europe. 
There is now a global realisation in all 
advanced nations that benefit entitlements 
have to be reformed so that countries can 
achieve sustainable gross debt positions. 
Europe’s politicians have already achieved 
a great deal since the start of the sovereign 
debt crisis, with extensive austerity 
measures introduced in Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, Greece and Ireland.
Nonetheless it remains a dangerous 
period for European economies. This is the 
most painful part of the cycle. Austerity 
pushes economies into contraction and 
recession. Tax revenues go down and 
generate a need for further cuts and less 
public spending, so there is more austerity. 
This creates a negative cycle that takes a 
long time to work through. Pushing for too 
much austerity can create a social backlash 
that destroys the whole project, so policies 
have to be managed very carefully. In this 
respect, Japan’s social cohesion clearly 
puts it in a better position than many more 
socially fragile countries. 
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Too much austerity can create a social backlash that 
destroys the whole project, so policies have to be carefully
 managed... so Japan’s social cohesion puts it in a 
better position than more socially fragile countries. 
The Tokyo Stock  
Exchange in actionBANKING
By aaROn BROWn
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Three-way   
stretch
The United States, the United Kingdom and 
the European Union are at loggerheads over 
how derivatives should be policed, leading 
regulators to emphasise and advocate different 
reforms. Can these differences be reconciled?
  T
he  aphorism  “if goods don’t cross 
borders,  soldiers  will”  is  usually  at-
tributed  to  the  great  19th  century 
French economist and liberal Frédéric 
Bastiat. Whoever said it first, it is undoubtedly 
accurate – and is as valid an analysis today as 
when it was first made. Goods flows require 
offsetting financial flows, which create demand 
for derivatives, which in turn creates conflicts 
between the regulations – and inevitably regu-
lators – in different countries.
For example, the Bank of England governor 
Sir Mervyn King is said to have lost his temper 
in a meeting on the subject with European in-
ternal markets commissioner Michel Barnier. 
The latter has also been undiplomatically blunt 
in expressing his unhappiness with the Ameri-
can approach, arguing that “the United States 
must not override European Union regulators”.
For all the rhetoric, there is a general agree-
ment among regulators about the broad areas 
in which changes should be made to the way 
derivatives are controlled (see Box). The prob-
lem comes in translating these general princi-
ples into detailed policy, particularly as there is 
no international body to enforce any system of 
global financial regulation.
Indeed there was no formal international co-
operation at all until 1974, when the minds of 
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decision of German bank supervisors to force 
Bank  Herstatt  into  liquidation.  Due  to  time 
zone differences, other banks had released Ger-
man deutschmark payments to Herstatt before 
the seizure, in return for US dollar payments 
to be made in New York after the seizure. As a 
result, these banks lost out. This failure of co-
ordination led the G10 countries to form the 
Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  at 
the end of that year.
From  its  modest  beginning  as  a  forum  for 
bank regulators to keep in touch, the Basel Com-
mittee has grown to become the main source of 
rules for global financial institutions. However, 
it has no direct authority. In each country, na-
tional  bank  regulators  set  specific  regulations 
that are supposed to be compliant with Basel 
standards. The agreement is that each country 
will  respect  other  countries’  implementations. 
As long as an institution is supervised by a Basel-
compliant national regulator, all other countries 
are supposed to accept it as if it complied with 
their domestic versions of the rules.
For all the criticisms of Basel I, II and now III, 
it is an impressive international achievement. 
Countries  with  different  economic  philoso-
phies and interests have managed to agree on 
detailed rules over decades as political leaders 
came and went. The financial crisis, however, 
has strained relations. The US, EU and UK are 
all pulling in slightly different directions. But 
it’s not the differences of opinion that matter 
so much as whether each set of regulators will 
continue to accept foreign rules as equivalent to 
its own. If that agreement breaks down, there 
won’t just be inconsistent regulation of deriva-
tives, but also the risk of a step backward in 
general global financial cooperation.
The issues are, of course, complex, and there 
are many shades of opinion within each juris-
diction. But, in simple terms, the primary focus 
of the US is to ensure that there will be no need 
for another bailout of the financial system, not 
least because it seems unlikely that any feder-
al official would be re-elected after voting for 
such a policy.
The  United  States  banking  system  is  rela-
tively strong and it controls its own currency, 
which  is  still  the  reserve  currency  and  safe 
haven for the world. So its government can af-
ford  to  concentrate  on  protecting  taxpayers. 
Moreover, the size and sophistication of Ameri-
can financial markets means that global inves-
tors need to participate in them, however much 
inconvenience they face in doing so.
While United Kingdom policy is also designed 
to avoid another bailout, this is not a short-term 
priority, as many of the largest banks are nation-
alised, and the politicians do not have to face the 
electorate for two or three years. The UK’s main 
focus has been on rebuilding bank capital so fi-
nancial institutions can stand on their own. It 
has been reluctant to accept the restrictions on 
derivative trading which the US and EU want, 
because  it  cares  about  the  profitability  of  its 
banks. In fact, the UK would like to profit from 
over-regulated US and shaky EU systems.
Continental Western Europe, of course, faces 
the biggest problems and the greatest dilem-
mas. It has the weakest banks, and sovereign 
credit problems make it much more difficult 
– if not impossible – to support financial in-
stitutions which come under pressure. Policy-
making in the EU is further complicated by the 
need to get agreement between more than 20 
governments, in most of which internal opin-
ion is deeply divided. There is a particular prob-
lem in that the UK, while an EU member, has 
such radically different interests to its partners. 
Continental European governments cannot af-
ford the levels of capital requirements the UK 
would like to impose, nor the ruthless transpar-
ency the US is pushing for. On the other hand, 
it has the least to lose if rules reduce the profit-
ability of derivatives trading.
These different interests have led regulators 
to emphasise and advocate different reforms. 
The US argues that it is necessary to have lots of 
collateral which will stand between taxpayers 
and disaster; and it also advocates central clear-
ing and swap execution facilities to reduce risk. 
The UK sees the solution mainly in terms of in-
creasing bank capital. The EU has focused on 
standardisation and reporting – in other words, 
the solutions that cost the least but might prove 
the most restrictive to the market.
With the usual give and take of multilateral 
negotiations, there should in principle be lit-
tle difficulty in putting together a compromise 
that meets the needs of all three groups. After 
all, the regulators want elements of all of the six 
ways of controlling the market and all jurisdic-
tions will benefit from consistent international 
standards. Unfortunately, there are more fun-
damental differences that are harder to smooth 
away. The US argues that it can only protect 
itself if it includes under its regulatory author-
ity  anyone  who  makes  large  trades  with  US 
financial institutions anywhere in the world, 
and also with all the foreign entities controlled 
by US institutions.
It has also committed itself to a very aggressive 
schedule for introducing regulations for the high-
ly complex derivatives market. This makes it diffi-
cult for the US to agree to accept slower and (from 
its point of view) possibly weaker regulations that 
may not be compatible with US versions. Conse-
quently, it may impose its rules on all sorts of for-
eign entities, leaving the EU and the UK with an 
unpleasant choice: they can either impose double 
regulations on their financial institutions or sur-
render regulatory control to the US.
  1 
CENTRAL CLEARINg.
exchange-traded derivatives 
have always had 
clearinghouses, but until recently most 
over-the-counter (oTc) derivatives 
have been private bilateral contracts 
between the parties. When Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt in 2008, 
it had 906,000 oTc derivative 
contracts totaling $35 trillion in 
notional value, with 6,120 different 
counterparty combinations. it 
took more than three years to sort 
everything out.
With central clearing, some of 
Lehman’s contracts, as much as 
90 per cent by some estimates, 
would have offset each other. in 
any event, all of them would have 
been with a single counterparty, the 
clearinghouse. That might have made 
the resolution speedier and more 
efficient, posing less systemic risk to 
the financial system.
  2
SwAp ExECUTIoN 
fACILITIES.
exchange-traded derivatives 
are bought and sold in active markets 
where multiple parties can make bids 
and offers. if similar markets could be set 
up for oTc derivatives, it might improve 
price information, liquidity and fairness.
  3
REpoRTINg.
no one knows the total notional 
value of derivatives in the world: 
estimates range from $600 trillion to 
$1.5 trillion. Moreover, total notional 
value is not a useful measure, either of 
the risk of a systemic crisis caused by 
derivatives or of the effect of derivative 
trading on underlying security prices.
  4
STANDARDISATIoN.
all the first three objectives 
stated above are made 
easier to achieve if oTc derivatives 
are standardised. While full 
standardisation is not practical, many 
regulators believe that a relatively 
small set of standardised oTc 
contracts could absorb much of the 
notional volume in the market.
  5
CoLLATERAL.
if counterparties cannot make 
payments under derivative 
agreements, it could cause a gridlock 
that freezes the financial system. a 
cannot pay B, so B cannot pay c, 
and so on until Z cannot pay a, and 
financial activity stops due to failure 
of a relatively small institution. if 
counterparties post large amounts of 
collateral, the potential for problems 
is reduced significantly.
  6
CApITAL.
collateral helps the liquidity 
of the financial markets in 
the short term, but regulators are 
also worried about the solvency 
of financial institutions in the long 
term. Financial institutions have less 
chance of failing if they hold enough 
capital to cover potential losses from 
derivatives trading.
CONTROLLING DERIVATIVE MARKETS      Continental European 
governments cannot afford the 
levels of capital requirements  
the UK would like to impose, nor 
the ruthless transparency the 
US is pushing for. On the other 
hand, it has the least to lose if 
rules reduce the profitability  
of derivatives trading
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The UK’s policy goal, raising bank capital re-
quirements, is in principle much more straight-
forward  than  designing  a  derivatives  trading 
system from scratch. However, while it has no 
interest in enforcing the higher requirements 
on EU or US banks, it does not want to cede 
control of capital levels for its banks to foreign 
regulators. It particularly does not want to cede 
this power to foreign regulators which are un-
able to set strict rules and high levels because 
their banks cannot afford them.
If the US wants to tell everyone what to do, 
and the UK doesn’t want anyone to tell it what 
to do, the EU’s goal is to reach a consensus. That 
makes the EU sound like an organisation seeking 
the best compromise. However, Brussels does 
not want to agree to anything as sophisticated 
as the US plans or as simple as those proposed by 
the UK. The EU wants to make the financial sys-
tem safer by restricting derivative trading, not by 
fixing it or putting capital against it.
There  is  another  level  to  this  controversy. 
Central bankers are arguably more concerned 
with international harmony than specifics of 
regulation. In contrast, other financial regula-
tors are more likely to focus on domestic con-
cerns and worry less about whether their ac-
tions will make life difficult for regulators in 
other countries. This means that central bank-
ers could probably get together and thrash out 
agreement without too much of a problem, but 
that a host of newly-created and newly-empow-
ered regulators will find it almost impossible to 
reach a consensus.
The most likely outcome is that the central 
bankers will exercise their authority and that 
international comity will prevail. This means 
there  will  have  been  an  acceptance  that  the 
spirit of Basel is far too important to be put in 
jeopardy. International financial cooperation is 
necessary for too many reasons to let a dispute 
over regulating derivatives strain relations.
That means that the final resolution is likely to 
include looser capital levels than the UK would 
like and more restrictions on derivative trading 
and less collateral in the system than the US 
would like. For the EU, it’s not a question of like 
or dislike, it’s a question of survival. Therefore 
the compromise will be tilted toward EU inter-
ests.  But  this  will  mean  that  inevitably  more 
derivative trading business will move to the US 
and UK (where most of it is anyway). This doesn’t 
seem like a great solution, or even a solution at 
all, but at least no soldiers are marching. 
With the usual give and take 
of multi-lateral negotiations, 
there should in principle be little 
difficulty in putting together 
a compromise that meets the  
needs of all three groups
Regulators have been worried by the 
rapid growth in notional amounts of 
global over-the-counter derivatives, 
peaking at over $700 trillion 
in 2011. They argue that, while 
derivatives can be used to increase 
or to decrease risk, there is a risk to 
the financial system.
However, market practitioners 
argue that the lower market 
value (showing how much money 
would change hands to settle all 
derivatives) is a much better guide 
than the notional figure. Market 
value is 5 per cent of the notional 
value, though it would still peak 
at $35 trillion. even the red line is 
overstated, however, because a lot 
of those derivatives are offsetting 
contracts held by the same entity.
When collateralisation of debt and 
the potential market value of debt are 
taken into account and the focus is on 
bank-to-bank and sovereign-to-bank 
derivatives, the risk can be calculated 
at $100 billion globally. These are 
affordable numbers in a $70 trillion 
global economy. Practitioners argue 
that derivatives just aren’t all that  
risky compared to natural disasters, 
wars, pollution, government defaults 
and recessions. But it appears  
that this argument has yet to convince 
the regulators.
Source: Bank for international Settlements
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Worries about the 
US corporate debt market  
may be misplaced – low 
borrowing costs mean that  
the potential for profit is  
still there and is being 
exploited by smart operators.
Rocket  
fuel, anyone?
By ROBERT hamBURgERCORPORATE DEBT
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community responded to these develop-
ments by moving on to more lucrative 
dealing opportunities with a similar or 
lower risk profile.
Careful scrutiny of the private, non-
listed  US  unsecured  corporate  debt 
market reveals that it still provides an 
important source of income, not only 
to the intermediary investment bank-
ing community but also to the invest-
ing  institutions.  Equally,  it  supplies 
a very important source of capital to 
both investment-grade and, to a much 
lesser  extent,  non-investment-grade 
corporate  borrowers,  both  US  and 
foreign. Investment banking interme-
diaries  and  institutional  suppliers  of 
capital make a lot of money supplying 
needy borrowers who prefer relatively 
high-cost  debt  to  higher-cost  equity. 
Therefore this market works well, with 
all the participants benefitting.
Take an example from two decades 
ago which demonstrates the important 
international role of the US corporate 
debt market. The chairman of Williams 
Holdings, a UK public company with a 
very large portion of its business and 
profits in the US, was approached by 
the US Prudential Insurance Company 
–  through  the  then-independent  US 
investment bank Smith Barney – with 
an  offer  of  $100  million  in  ten-year 
unsecured  debt  capital.  The  Pruden-
tial’s  internal  analysis  indicated  that 
even unsecured senior debt payable by 
the  top-tier  holding  company  would 
be  investment  grade  if  rated  by  the 
  ome bankers
and commentators in the United States 
appear  to  be  increasingly  worried 
about what they see as a lack of liquid-
ity  in  the  country’s  $8  trillion  cor-
porate debt market. This could, they 
fear, increase the cost of raising funds, 
thereby  putting  at  risk  US  economic 
revival. There is a case for saying that 
these worries are misplaced. The US 
corporate debt market has invariably 
been and continues to be a relatively 
illiquid  market,  due  mainly  to  the 
diverse nature of its securities.
For  that  reason  alone,  the  cost  of 
unsecured US corporate fixed-income 
capital  has  always  been  higher  than 
most  other  forms  of  unsecured  debt 
capital. The US corporate debt market 
is generally divided up between invest-
ment grade securities issued by compa-
nies like IBM and P&G and non-invest-
ment grade securities issued by smaller 
companies  with  more  balance-sheet 
leverage and riskier cashflows.
According  to  Bloomberg,  average 
borrowing  costs  on  US  investment-
grade  bonds  fell  to  a  record  low  of 
3.096 per cent in July 2012, compared 
with 3.37 per cent barely three weeks 
earlier.  High-yield  debt,  rated  below 
Baa3 by Moody’s Investors Service and 
lower than BBB- by Standard & Poor’s, 
was yielding 7.66 per cent on the same 
day,  the  least  since  May.  Bearing  in 
mind that a little more than ten years 
ago the yields on investment grade and 
non-investment  grade  US  corporate 
debt were more than double those of 
today, the cost of debt capital to US 
corporates is not a major obstacle to 
borrowing.
When the return on equity to Wall 
Street investment banking firms from 
dealing  in  listed  US  corporate  fixed- 
income  securities  was  high  and  the 
risks  relatively  low,  the  dealing  firms 
were willing to make markets, commit 
capital, and provide liquidity. However, 
that  changed  when  investing  institu-
tions increasingly focused on reducing 
their dealing costs in order to increase 
their  yields,  and  regulators  instituted 
rules that effectively reduced return on 
capital. Neither the institutional inves-
tors nor the regulators should have been 
surprised that the investment banking 
US corporate bond issuance   
soared in the first quarter, driven 
not only by historically low 
borrowing costs but also by   
strong investor demand
for both investment-grade 
and high-yield securities
S
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agencies.  Had  Williams  approached 
the  UK  domestic  market  for  that 
amount of unsecured debt without any 
support from the operating subsidiar-
ies,  they  would  have  been  promptly 
shown the door – as would have any 
other  significantly  even  more  credit-
worthy UK companies.
However, Prudential saw an oppor-
tunity to earn a handsome return from 
a  high-quality  company;  Williams 
Holdings saw a unique opportunity to 
raise what was seen in the UK as high-
risk capital that could not be justified 
at any interest rate. When the deal was 
done, dusted and well seasoned, Wil-
liams’s chairman was asked about the 
importance  of  US  Prudential’s  com-
mitment to his company. He respond-
ed that the money was the rocket fuel 
that powered his company forward to 
its next stage of development. That re-
sponse is as valid today as it was then. 
This  year  many  corporate  borrow-
ers are using the US public and pri-
vate corporate bond market to obtain 
much needed capital to fuel their own 
expansion plans.
According  to  Fitch,  “US  corporate 
bond issuance soared in the first quar-
ter, driven not only by historically low 
borrowing  costs  but  also  by  strong 
investor demand for both investment-
grade and high-yield securities. Fitch 
Ratings’  preliminary  tabulation  of 
first-quarter bond market activity in-
leading  European  money  manager 
confided recently in London that large 
institutional  clients  and  ultra  high-
net-worth  family  offices  started  sit-
ting on their hands in May and did so 
even more in following months. There 
are authoritative US voices, too, sug-
gesting that there is a general waning 
of confidence. 
If the US and global economies were 
strong and growth was clearly on the 
cards,  politicians  would  have  more 
room for manoeuvre. Unfortunately, it 
seems that growth is waning in Europe 
and  some  key  economies  that  tradi-
tionally fuel global growth are slowing 
or even contracting. For example, the 
UK economy has thus far contracted 
in 2012 and there is serious concern 
that  it  will  continue  to  do  so  unless 
the political leadership and the Bank 
of  England  act  quickly.  China’s  eco-
nomic growth is moderating, and the 
US economy is certainly not poised for 
meaningful expansion.
The  second  factor  that  could  radi-
cally  change  the  nature  of  the  US 
corporate debt market is the introduc-
tion of more technology. At present – 
and for most of the next decade – the 
most important factor influencing this 
market is, and will continue to be the 
individuals  who  lead  the  corporate 
debt  market.  Most  US  fixed-income 
markets have traditionally been popu-
lated  by  highly  intelligent,  creative 
     The second quarter of 2012  
saw record amounts of high-grade 
bonds being issued by the likes  
of IBM, Berkshire and Diageo to 
eager investors for even modest 
spreads over US treasury bonds
people rather than processors or safe 
pairs of hands, but none more than the 
US corporate fixed income market.
These clever people gravitated there 
because of the need to make judgments 
on  a  variety  of  issues,  such  as  credit 
quality, the impact of a company’s name 
on investor appetite, the need for one 
type of covenant against another type. 
These  are  the  sorts  of  decisions  that 
processors and machines cannot read-
ily make. For these and other reasons, 
they  could  make  more  money  in  the 
US corporate fixed income market for 
themselves and for their firms than in 
many other areas of investment banks.
Such people can produce a higher re-
turn on capital than processors or algo-
rithm-driven  machines.  However,  the 
return on capital from this market is de-
creasing, while the risks of participating 
in this market are staying the same or 
even increasing, just as they are in other 
fixed-income markets. This means that 
US  corporate  debt  securities  will  be 
simplified and electronic platforms will 
eventually be developed to replace the 
talented individuals who used to make 
this market work so efficiently.
Many of those looking into the fu-
ture  believe  that  national  securities 
exchanges  will  gradually  become 
financial  dinosaurs  as  they  become 
interlinked  and  increasingly  move 
toward  electronic  platforms.  They 
extrapolate  from  this  starting-point 
that a truly global interlinked exchange 
for all types of securities will provide 
more liquidity for investors and low-
er  prices  for  securities,  as  expensive 
people will gradually be dramatically 
reduced  if  not  eliminated.  They  also 
see technology enabling a more stable 
market for securities, as there will be 
fewer  surprises  and  less  market 
manipulation.
Clearly, the US corporate debt mar-
ket  is  impacted  not  only  by  people, 
regulations,  market  conditions,  poli-
tics,  the  US  and  global  economies, 
and  technology,  but  also  by  market 
dynamics. For the lion’s share of the 
next  decade,  people  will  continue  to 
play a major role in this market. There-
after,  other  factors  will  begin  to  re-
place human input. On balance that is 
likely to make for a more efficient and 
attractive US corporate debt market. 
Many looking into the future   
believe that national securities 
exchanges will gradually become 
financial dinosaurs as they become 
interlinked and increasingly 
move toward electronic platforms
dicates that issuance by both financial 
institutions and industrials rose by 76 
per cent from fourth-quarter 2011 as 
global macro fears subsided somewhat 
and spreads tightened.”
Issuers are attracted by overall low in-
terest rates, and investors by the spreads 
over US treasuries, which remain very 
attractive. The second quarter of 2012 
saw  record  amounts  of  high-grade 
bonds being issued by the likes of IBM, 
Berkshire and Diageo to eager investors 
for even modest spreads over US treas-
ury bonds. The third quarter saw more 
of  the  same,  with  resurgence  in  the 
issuance of high-yield, non-investment-
grade bonds and the leveraged buyout 
market once again beginning to thrive.
  I
n  a  “going  private”  transaction
being sponsored by Goldman Sachs 
and P2 Capital Partners, Interline 
Brands was able to secure highly 
attractive high-yield debt that has mini-
mal covenants and that will provide the 
company with an important part of the 
rocket fuel it needs to take advantage of 
expansion opportunities.
How could this rosy picture change? 
The  first  factor  could  be  the  fragile 
state of the global economy. Current 
market  conditions  appear  buoyant, 
but,  beneath  the  surface,  a  serious 
slowdown in economic activity lurks 
and investors, especially those in Eu-
rope, have become more cautious. A 50    uantum Finance in PeSPecTiVe   OCTOBER 2012
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At a time of severe financial restraint, venture 
capital is the one bright spot amid the gloom 
for enterprises seeking start-up funding 
or investment, and also offers exciting 
opportunities for investors.  
But there may be limits to  
its scope, says William Kay.
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he  continuing global re-
cession  has  intensified  the 
search for potential catalysts 
to  kick  moribund  econo-
mies into much-needed activity. That search has 
turned renewed attention onto venture capital, 
which conveniently pumps life into start-ups and 
smaller businesses, sectors that have the potential 
in aggregate to be major employers.
Venture capital (VC) can also satisfy the parallel 
hunt by investors for outlets offering more excitement 
than floundering stock markets and bonds which, at 
the most secure end, offer the poorest of returns. The 
big question is whether VC can attract finance on a 
sufficient scale to achieve what its supporters claim. 
On  this  question,  the  controversial  initial  public 
offering (IPO) of shares in Facebook this year has led 
governments and investors to reassess its potential.
Facebook raised $16 billion, making it the largest 
tech IPO in history and the third-largest American 
IPO ever, outstripped only by Visa’s $19.7 billion in 
March 2008 and the $18.1 billion raised by Gener-
al Motors in November 2010, according to Thom-
son Reuters. Of the total amount raised for Face-
book, Accel Partners, one of the early VC investors, 
turned $12.7 million into $7 billion. With fellow 
backers  Greylock  Partners  and  Meritel  Capital, 
Accel can expect to bask for years in the enhanced 
credibility and deal flow from that one transaction.
While Facebook waved the flag for VC, it is a sec-
tor that has traditionally financed the early-stage 
enterprises that politicians see as engines of job 
creation, increasing spending power and therefore 
economic regeneration. President Obama signed 
his Jobs Act into law in April with the observation 
relating to entrepreneurs that “when their ideas 
Seeding 
future growth
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take root, we get inventions that can change the 
way  we  live.  And  when  their  businesses  take 
off, more people become employed”. In Britain, 
this argument has convinced the government to 
increase the capital Venture Capital Trusts can 
invest in each prospect.
As VC often provides the fuel for those take-offs, 
it should logically be centre-stage in the search for 
ideas to regenerate economies that have been flat-
lining. A report by Experian for the British Ven-
ture Capital Association indicated that VC-backed 
businesses  showed  stronger  turnover  growth 
between 2006 and 2010 than other enterprises, 
trebling sales compared with their benchmark. 
Profit growth and job creation were also much 
stronger within VC-backed companies, with an 
80 per cent rise in employment over the four-year 
sample period. Other enterprises saw very little 
change in overall employment numbers.
Colin Ellis, chief economist of the BVCA, said: 
“This study shows that VC-backed businesses have 
outperformed their peers, but without enjoying vast-
ly higher margins, suggesting that these companies 
are good at winning market share, thereby putting 
themselves on a sustainable footing going forwards.”
That is sweet music to entrepreneurs who have 
been struggling to obtain bank finance, as capital 
adequacy rules make loans scarcer and the banks 
become more preoccupied with fighting off legis-
lators and regulators. Even though VC finance can 
be demanding in terms of boardroom representa-
tion and share of the exit cake, business founders 
are more willing to consider it.
The message is spreading. Deloitte and the US 
National Venture Capital Association’s 2012 global 
venture capital confidence survey show surges of in-
terest in countries as far-flung as Brazil. The overall 
economic performances of Germany and India have 
inspired their VC sectors too, but in absolute terms 
they still lag far behind the US and UK. Yet the 
widely perceived image of the sector remains, by and 
large, that of a bit-part player with a small-scale busi-
ness model that can have only a marginal impact.
Nevertheless  Frederick  Adler,  the  doyen  of 
venture capital, said: “The biggest change is the 
enormous amount of capital coming into the in-
dustry, which has precipitated many people into 
looking for new prospects. But VC has been mov-
ing slowly, surprisingly so to me. The people in it 
are capable of doing much more.”
A few leaders of VC firms, such as Jim Breyer 
at Accel, have already been making personal for-
tunes rivalling those of top bankers and private 
equity managers, without suffering anything like 
as much public opprobrium. The reason is that in 
most cases, unlike the bankers, they have risked 
their own capital and – more pertinently – their 
operations are relatively transparent.
The search by wealthy investors for reliable alter-
natives to crisis-hit traditional bonds and equities 
led many into VC. But as more money poured into 
the sector and trading conditions became tougher 
in the global recession, the tendency grew to favour 
larger, more established, safer bets at the expense 
of out-and-out blue-sky start-ups. The approach is 
in effect becoming closer to that in the investment 
spectrum traditionally occupied by private equity.
The debate about the role of VC is really part of 
a wider discussion over primary financing for what 
are, despite Facebook, overwhelmingly small firms. 
In 2009, the US Small Business Administration 
said that of 600,000 business formations a year, 
only about 1,000 received VC finance. But a study 
by two respected academics, Steve Kaplan at the 
University of Chicago and Josh Lerner at Harvard 
Business  School,  found  that  between  1999  and 
2009 60 per cent of IPOs were VC-backed. So the 
sector has a good track record in picking winners.
Some observers argue that there is an inherent 
limit to the size of VC funds. Roger Ehrenberg, 
managing partner at IA Ventures, said: “VC, unlike 
hedge funds, doesn’t scale as well, due to the illiq-
uid nature of the asset class and the time required 
to manage a single investment. Also, the costs of 
compliance, reporting and control are much more 
easily attained by smaller firms through outsourced 
service-providers. Once a firm achieves a certain 
scale – somewhere between $50 and $100 mil-
lion in committed capital – I argue that the com-
petitive advantages of scale, as it relates to running 
the  operation,  have  largely  been  neutralised.”
As VC firms stretched themselves in the 1990s, that 
limitation may have contributed to the crash that 
burst the dotcom bubble, which took the sector a 
decade to live down. Then it was hit by the recession. 
In 2009 and 2010, 252 venture firms raised a com-
bined $25.2 billion, compared with the $68.7 billion 
raised by 419 funds in the two years before that.
But, buoyed by the success of the Facebook flota-
tion, VC’s supporters are speaking out ever more 
strongly. Adler insists that “it’s technology, tech-
nology, technology, technology. And it’s expand-
ing. I can debate whether it’s overpriced or under-
priced. In the new period, there is an enormous 
burst that will go on for quite a while. If you are 
smart enough and willing to do the work, and have 
the access to technology, you are going to win.”
Breyer, too, is extremely bullish. He says: “We 
are in a period now that I’ve never seen in terms of 
the environment for young entrepreneurs, be they 
in Palo Alto, Boston, Beijing or Sao Paolo. When 
there’s this much change and uncertainty occur-
ring in all the major technology stacks, it simply 
offers  unprecedented  opportunity  for  entrepre-
neurs to build new technologies and applications. 
This kind of innovation tends to occur once or 
twice a decade historically.”
Breyer believes the most exciting opportunities 
are “where traditional ecosystems and industries 
are  seeing  accelerating  disruption”,  adding  that 
“for the next couple of years I can’t imagine a better 
      VC-backed businesses have 
outperformed their peers, but 
without enjoying vastly higher 
margins, suggesting that these 
companies are good at  
winning market share
CoLin eLLis, ChieF eConomist oF the BVCa.
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
7
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The chinese do many 
things differently from 
the West, and they 
are pursuing a different 
investment model 
through the dominant 
state-owned Shenzhen 
capital Group, with 
its mixture of Vc, 
regional guidance 
funds, international 
joint ventures and 
commercial funds.
Shenzhen claims a 
36 per cent average 
annual investment rate 
of return and by July 
2010, the latest figures 
available, had invested 
$9.5 billion in 287 
projects, an average of 
$33 million each. That 
is equal to 0.16 per 
cent of annual chinese 
output, where GDP was 
$5.9 trillion in 2010. 
US venture capital 
investment accounts for 
2 per cent of GDP.
chinese Vc growth 
has been startling since 
2006, even allowing 
for the impact of the 
global recession, 
but this may be a 
temporary phase. 
Studies indicate that the 
chinese approach is 
based much more than 
in the West on investors 
building relationships, 
not just with ceos but 
right down to mid-level 
managers.
Their preference for 
eschewing the quick hit 
in favour of a long-term 
approach may be 
coming through in the 
cumulative numbers, 
but it also suggests that 
there may be a plateau 
until the next set of 
relationships bears fruit.
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environment around the world to be disrupting 
traditional companies and providing innovative 
new applications and services.”
Whilst insisting that Accel Partners has well-
tested  systems  for  valuing  start-ups,  Breyer 
accepts that luck plays a large role in every success 
story. “That means daily testing and retesting of 
our investing hypotheses,” he said.
Why is VC so resilient? Simply because, accord-
ing to Georgeanne Perkins, a managing director 
of  Fisher  Lynch  Capital,  inventors  do  not  stop 
inventing. The key, she says, “is to be selective and 
patient. VC is not for the faint of heart or those 
who can’t manage with some illiquidity, because 
building value takes time. But invention never has 
a recession. Technology continues to evolve at a 
rapid pace, and entrepreneurs continue to actively 
start new companies and seek the most experi-
enced VCs to help fund and build them.”
She argues that the index returns for VC never 
have been, and never will be, worth the risk and 
illiquidity, but that there should always be great 
returns for those few VCs who consistently make 
visionary, educated, valued-added bets on inno-
vation. “In a slow-growth economy with volatile 
public markets and low interest rates, top-quartile 
venture  capital  should  outperform  other  asset 
classes, because VC – that virtuous circle – is the 
only investment opportunity that creates some-
thing out of virtually nothing,” she says.
That eternal hope is what keeps VC’s supporters 
going through thick and thin. The entrepreneurs 
offer hope, and the VC funds offer the means 
to convert that hope into riches. Governments 
would like to turn this “hope machine” into an 
engine for economic revival but – other than by 
loosening its tax restraints – they have had little 
success when getting too directly involved.
Past efforts at state-controlled VC have been 
about as successful and creative as they have 
been in state-controlled film industries. Imme-
diately after World War II, the UK government 
created Investors in Industry and the Industrial 
and  Commercial  Finance  Corporation  –  later 
bundled up and floated on the stock market as 3i. 
British administrations discovered that there is 
an inherent conflict between the need to deploy 
taxes responsibly and the flair to take a gamble 
on what may seem at first blush to be hopelessly 
unlikely business prospects. Now China is trying 
to square that same circle (see Box).
Perhaps  VC  is  too  fragile  to  withstand  the 
weight of too much expectation as an economic 
regenerator. Once it reaches that scale and impor-
tance, the entrepreneurial lifeblood is liable to be 
stifled by bureaucracy. It’s a niche and that’s how 
they like it. As Kaplan and Lerner observed, VC is 
a cyclical business that will come and go and there 
are dangers in expecting too much from it.
“Despite ongoing concerns,” says Mark Heesen, 
president of the US National Venture Capital As-
sociation, “the opportunistic nature of the industry 
remains clear. Venture capitalists are nimble and 
can quickly move to where the most promising 
entrepreneurs, policies and innovations exist.” 
SCGC Number of Deals
by Industry (%)
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A
sset  management  seems 
to  have  enjoyed  a  rela-
tively  benign  financial 
crisis, and emerged as one 
area of the financial services commu-
nity where reputations are intact and 
the future relatively bright. Certainly 
many  bankers  envy  the  respectabil-
ity their asset management colleagues’ 
jobs  still  command,  while  some  bold 
claims about the buy side’s future role 
emanate from larger participants.
Investment  bankers,  memorably 
satirised by Michael Lewis in his book 
Asset management, it appears, 
has survived the financial   
crisis with its star undimmed 
and is riding high. But, says   
John Lawson, disappointment 
with performance and 
consequent pressure on fee 
structures may limit its appeal.
Licence  
to expand?56     uantum Finance in PeSPecTiVe   OCTOBER 2012
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Liar’s Poker as “a master-race of deal-
makers  possessing  vast  almost  un-
imaginable talent and ambition”, are 
currently  cowed  by  regulation  and 
accused of creating the crisis. Com-
mercial  bankers  are  castigated  for 
the abandonment of prudent funding 
principles at the same time as being 
vilified for a failure to finance busi-
ness. Yet their counterparts in asset 
management  are  riding  high  and 
consorting with governments.
The sector’s behemoth, BlackRock, 
is even compared regularly – and fa-
vourably – to Goldman Sachs in the 
finance firmament. It has persuaded 
Philipp  Hildebrand,  former  head 
of the Swiss National Bank, to join 
(from October 2012) and has become 
a  “go-to”  advisor  for  sophisticated 
organisations,  including  the  Central 
Bank of Ireland, the Federal Reserve 
of New York and HM Treasury.
The  bull  thesis  on  asset  manage-
ment’s future seems to hinge on two 
factors:  expectations that the role of 
the sector may evolve and broaden, 
and that regulation will remain rela-
tively light. Proponents suggest that 
the  group  may  supplant  financing, 
advisory and even trading roles left 
vacant by shrinking banks and bro-
kers. This “promotion” in status, it is 
argued, would reflect a fundamental 
shift in power from sell to buy side, 
with  asset  managers  potentially 
by-passing  investment  banks  and 
dealing directly with customers. 
This is also predicated on the 
continuing  retreat  of  banks, 
based on regulation and tight-
ening  of  capital  require-
ments, and a financing gap 
which bank balance sheets 
may no longer be able to 
accommodate.  Andreas 
Utermann,  global  co-
chief investment officer 
of  Allianz  Global  In-
vestments, argues that 
“infrastructure loans, infrastructure 
equities, bank loans – all that space 
which is illiquid and long duration – 
is something that governments need 
somebody to finance, which is where 
I  believe  we  come  in,  tapping  our 
institutional  investor  and  sovereign 
wealth contacts”.
Andrew Dyson, in charge of global 
distribution  at  Affiliated  Managers 
Group, is more circumspect. He says: 
“Clients recognise that the withdraw-
al of banks from the credit provision 
process is an opportunity. How that 
happens is still up for debate.”
Asset  managers  certainly  seem  to 
be  testing  whether  they  are  able  to 
take on a more active role in chan-
nelling capital from investors to com-
panies  and  governments,  by-passing 
investment banks. This is seen in pri-
vate debt placements, while alterna-
tive managers are busy raising capital 
for debt funds. In a world starved for 
yield, direct lending to issuers is prov-
ing an attractive model. BlackRock is 
even  beta-testing  its  own  securities 
trading  platform,  which  would  sup-
plant traditional market-makers.
But while there are examples, there 
is  not  yet  an  avalanche  of  change, 
perhaps partly because – with such 
weak  corporate  demand  for  debt 
and recent long-term bank refinanc-
ing – there is less pressure on banks’ 
balance  sheets,  pending  incoming 
Infrastructure loans, 
infrastructure equities,   
bank loans – all that space which 
is illiquid and long duration – is 
something that governments need 
somebody to finance, which  
is where I believe we come in
andreas Utermann, gLoBaL Co-ChieF inVestment oFFiCer,   
aLLianz gLoBaL inVestments
Source: BlackRock investment institute
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management’s 
future seems 
to hinge on 
two factors:  
expectations  
that the role of 
the sector may 
evolve and 
broaden, and 
that regulation 
will remain 
relatively light
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new  capital  adequacy  regulations.
The second helpful factor is regula-
tion. Fund firms and asset managers 
responsible for huge volumes of clients’ 
cash  have  so  far  been  largely  spared 
the  intense  scrutiny  experienced  by 
other financial professionals in the fall-
out from the global financial crisis. It 
should not surprise us that asset man-
agers have enjoyed a better press.
All  investment  banks  insist  that 
their  customers  come  first  –  this 
is  the  first  of  Goldman’s  “business 
principles”, for instance – yet asset 
management  companies  have  this 
defined in their structure, as money 
managers  for  clients.  The  invest-
ing  client  normally  retains  direct 
ownership  of  the  assets  managed 
and  openly  carries  the  market  risk 
to  those  funds.  However,  there  are 
also  plenty  of  challenges  to  the  as-
set management business, as clients 
remain  very  uncertain  where  to 
invest amidst current market volatil-
ity and low returns.
The crisis has focused attention on 
fees,  which  remain  under  pressure, 
particularly for equity products. Prod-
uct innovation in mainstream funds 
appears to have dried up in the face 
of weak investor appetite. New fund 
launches in Europe, once the lifeblood 
of the sector, are running at a quar-
ter of peak rates. In the United States, 
16 straight months of equity fund net 
outflows showed that investors have 
continued to lose faith in both equity 
markets and their managers.
Too  much  of  the  activity  of  as-
set management has been zero-sum 
squabbling  over  institutional  man-
dates  or  distribution  relationships. 
McKinsey’s latest survey of the glo-
bal asset management industry (pub-
lished in June 2012) indicates that, 
although total global financial assets 
have continued to rise to €169 tril-
lion, AMs’ share of this has declined 
from 25 per cent to 22 per cent. This 
implies a slight fall in assets under 
management  (AUM)  over  the  last 
four years. A key reason is competi-
tion from simple term-deposit prod-
ucts from the commercial banks and 
consumer finance houses to support 
their liquidity.
Meanwhile,  passive  index  and 
exchange-traded  funds  (ETFs)  are 
gaining  ground,  shading  the  per-
formance of the traditional mainstay 
of  defined  contribution  retirement 
business  in  mutual  funds.  Accord-
ing to the latest edition (June ’12) of 
BlackRock’s  ETP  Landscape,  total 
AUM in indexed products has grown 
by 16 per cent CAGR, even over the 
five years since market peak in 2007. 
These highly scalable products, par-
ticularly ETFs, are mix-negative for 
the  sector’s  returns.  In  June,  the 
European  Federation  of  Financial 
Services  Users  told  IndexUniverse, 
a  leading  independent  authority  on 
ETFs, that they found an asset man-
ager  charging  25  bps  in  fees  for  a 
CAC40  ETF,  versus  295  bps  for  its 
own equivalent index-tracker.
The  other  growth  area  is  “alter-
native”  investment:  namely  hedge 
funds,  private  equity  including  ven-
ture capital, and real estate/commodi-
ties. These are less easily scaled, could 
prove more volatile and more reputa-
tionally risky. Unlike traditional port-
folio  investment  in  public  markets, 
these  are  more  politically  sensitive 
investment  areas  and  may  require 
greater recourse to third parties.
Finally, the ownership of the indus-
try  remains  highly  fragmented  and 
diverse.  The  piece  which  has  seen 
most  shrinkage,  but  which  is  still 
large, is ownership by insurance com-
panies  –  and  especially  investment 
banks  themselves.  Goldman  Sachs 
continues to compete as an asset man-
ager amongst its other activities. Mer-
rill  (now  BofA/ML)  and  Citi  largely 
disengaged during the crisis.
There is a widespread belief, yet to be 
turned into a well-documented trend, 
that  bank  and  insurance  company 
deleveraging will throw off further fund 
management operations and allow the 
independent sector to grow. Consolida-
tion and additional scale will certainly 
be needed if asset management’s role is 
to expand. Investment banks often have 
hundreds  of  staff  members  engaged 
in risk assessment, far out of reach of 
many firms in today’s fragmented asset 
management industry.
But the greatest challenge for asset 
management  may  be  that,  if  it  does 
succeed  in  evolving  its  role,  it  may 
start  to  look  increasingly  like  invest-
ment  banks  themselves,  and  acquire 
a riskier profile, which will inevitably 
attract the attention of regulators. Take 
those bulging ETF issuers: though not 
yet proposed, it is not too far-fetched 
to suggest that firms like BlackRock, 
State Street Global Advisors and Lyxor 
may end up having to apply for bank-
ing licences for this activity.
ETFs  have  been  drawn  into  the 
shadow banking debate in particular 
as a result of their use of derivatives, 
securities lending and repo transac-
tions,  all  of  which  are  seen  as  key 
      Asset managers certainly seem  
to be testing whether they are able 
to take on a more active role in 
channelling capital from investors 
to companies and governments,  
by-passing investment banks
shadow  banking  activities.  “Market 
finance”, as ETF providors prefer to 
term  it,  plays  a  critical  role  in  the 
profitability of the product. Its fur-
ther growth may suggest greater need 
for regulation. AUM in fixed-income 
ETFs (the fastest-growing area) could 
reach US$2 trillion over the next 10 
years, according to iShares.
There  is  also  a  danger  in  overall 
firm size: in the US, which is still 40 
per cent of the AM industry, the FSOC 
(Financial Stability Oversight Council) 
may shortly designate non-bank SIFIs 
(systemically  important  financial  in-
stitutions).  This  could  include  asset 
management  firms,  and  draw  them 
into a web of further oversight, public 
philipp hildebrand, the former chairman of 
the Swiss central bank, is joining BlackRock
scrutiny  and  capital  requirements.
It remains to be seen if the condi-
tions  which  could  support  realign-
ment  and  broadening  of  the  asset 
management  role  prove  contradic-
tory.  Consolidation  is  needed,  as 
scale seems a precondition for devel-
oping  the  in-house  capabilities  and 
staffing behind competitive external 
services, for advisory mandates, for 
valuation  and  risk  management,  or 
even for trading platforms. Yet scale 
and role change will probably attract 
regulatory attention in a world where 
financial  innovation  is  now  treated 
with  suspicion.  Paul  Volcker’s  com-
ment that he couldn’t think of a use-
ful  financial  innovation  since  the 
ATM seems to set the tone for regu-
lators’ current thinking.
A further acid test of whether asset 
managers  have  trumped  investment 
banks may come in the recruitment 
statistics as we learn whether, despite 
all the vilification, mainstream finan-
cial  markets  and  investment  banks 
remain  the  most  interesting  to  top 
graduates.  Despite  sporadic  signs  of 
changes in its role, and the continued 
respectability  of  asset  management 
compared  to  banking,  its  humdrum 
reputation – and current disappoint-
ment  with  performance  and  con-
sequent  pressure  on  fee  structures 
–  may  continue  to  limit  the  pull  of 
asset  management  unless  much 
greater concentration evolves. 
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ne of the most 
controversial 
questions in economic 
policy is whether 
governments should 
intervene in or regulate capital 
markets. Pure free-marketeers 
believe that the “invisible hand” is 
a self-correcting mechanism, while 
advocates of intervention say that 
regulation enables governments to 
correct market failures and maximises 
social welfare.
When it comes to regulating stocks 
after their initial public offerings 
(IPO), many governments adopt 
a “disclosure-based approach”, 
involving limited government 
intervention. No official approval is 
needed before additional shares are 
issued so long as companies provide 
adequate disclosure. Nor is there 
an accounting-based profitability 
threshold that the company has 
to meet before issuing stock – the 
rationale is that such thresholds would 
create additional costs for investors.
There are inevitably costs associated 
with accounting-based regulation. 
In a world without transaction 
costs, parties will naturally achieve 
an efficient outcome without any 
intervention. Regulation, then, can 
only worsen the outcome, at the very 
least by imposing undue costs. Where 
there is regulation, governments must 
devote considerable amounts of money 
and time to the screening of new 
entrants, resources that could have 
been allocated to other government 
projects to enhance social welfare. 
Applicants also incur costs related to 
compliance.
Moreover, when an accounting-
based threshold is a key element of 
a regulation, there may be agency 
problems for investors. Regulations 
based on accounting numbers, such 
as a minimum return on equity (ROE) 
threshold, can provide incentives for 
contracting parties to manipulate 
accounting data opportunistically 
to meet these thresholds. Corporate 
managers may do so because they 
believe it will be costly for regulators 
to “undo” such behaviour. If a 
manager manipulates accounting data 
to meet criteria for issuing additional 
shares to the public, this action will 
trigger inefficient allocation of capital 
resources, and hence damage the 
interests of investors.
However, there are considerable 
benefits from using accountancy-
based regulation in the correct way in 
the right markets. In efficient capital 
markets, investors are sophisticated 
enough to weed out poorly performing 
firms, so accounting-based 
regulations are not needed to gauge 
the performance of new entrants. 
However, the situation in emerging 
markets can be very different; here 
accounting-based regulation may 
deliver benefits that exceed the costs. 
At the early stage of capital market 
development, investors do not have 
enough sophistication to distinguish 
Should governments step in to regulate 
capital markets? Wang Jiwei argues that 
intervention will often worsen the outcome 
in developed markets, but in emerging 
markets accounting-based regulation may 
deliver benefits that exceed the costs.
the bar
Raising 
O
     Where there is regulation, governments 
must devote considerable amounts of money 
and time to the screening of new entrants – 
resources that could have been allocated to 
other projects to enhance social welfare
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average return on equity of 10 per cent 
and a minimum of 6 per cent in each 
of previous three years. This decision 
was taken because the 10 per cent 
annual return on equity threshold 
regulation introduced in 1996 
triggered significant opportunistic 
earnings manipulation.
The evidence for this comes from 
the sharp increase in reported 
return on equity, which was 10-11 
per cent for 1995-1998 (see chart). 
It marked a sharp contrast to the 
pattern between 1992 and 1994 when 
there was no ROE requirement. The 
CSRC responded to public criticism 
by lowering the threshold – though 
the principle of a threshold was still 
contained in the regulations.
The next stage in extending the 
options to raise additional capital 
came in 2000, when the CSRC 
allowed large-scale seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO) by issuing regulations 
similar to those introduced in 1993 
to govern rights offerings. The CSRC 
believed that China’s capital market 
had become more efficient during 
the first seven years and would 
automatically correct market failures. 
This regulation did not impose a 
strict profitability threshold, and any 
company with profits in the previous 
three years could apply to the CSRC 
for SEO authorisation.
However, there were to be changes 
between the good and bad companies 
in the market. 
Moreover, firms can manipulate 
the selling price of stocks at a big 
discount. This means existing 
shareholders have to choose between 
either buying additional shares, 
irrespective of the firm’s performance, 
or seeing their ownership diluted. 
Finally there are severe “adverse 
selection problems” in emerging 
markets, especially in comparison 
with developed markets. That is 
because managers, as insiders, know 
more than market participants about 
the true value of the firm and have an 
incentive to issue additional shares 
when stock prices are overvalued.
These market failures cannot be 
automatically corrected, because the 
market per se is inefficient. In these 
circumstances, governments should 
help by intervening and imposing 
accounting-based regulation. This 
helps investors to differentiate 
between good and bad firms and 
can minimise adverse selection 
by managers. These benefits may 
exceed the costs associated with the 
misallocation of capital resources.
China is an example of where this 
approach has been adopted. The 
government has used accounting-
based methods to regulate shares 
issued by listed companies, and its 
experience sheds light on the costs 
and benefits in emerging capital 
markets. In the early 1990s, China’s 
listed companies could only issue 
additional shares through pre-emptive 
rights offered to existing shareholders. 
Due to the lack of other means of 
raising capital and the Chinese 
investing public’s insatiable demand 
for stocks at this time, rights offerings 
were excessively abused. To curb 
this, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) issued 
regulations to restrict rights issues 
after November 1993. From that date, 
listed companies were only allowed to 
issue rights to existing shareholders 
if they had been profitable in the 
previous two years.
Then, in September the following 
year, the CSRC decided that listed 
companies that wished to issue 
additional shares must show at least 
three years’ profits and a minimum 
three-year average return on equity of 
10 per cent. The CSRC decided on this 
measure because they had found that 
listed companies wanting to make 
rights offerings were manipulating 
accounting numbers to report a profit. 
In January 1996, the threshold was 
increased to a minimum return on 
equity of 10 per cent in each of the 
previous three years, since the 1994 
regulation was failing to curb the 
abuses.
Further changes were required in 
1999, when the CSRC lowered the 
threshold to a minimum three-year 
in these regulations over subsequent 
years. Amendments to the regulations 
for seasoned equity offerings followed 
a similar path to those introduced 
for rights offerings. The original 
regulation issued in May 2000 which 
allowed listed companies with three 
years’ profits to apply for approval to 
conduct seasoned equity offerings was 
replaced 10 months later with rules 
which increased the threshold to a 
three-year average ROE of 6 per cent.
This was not a definitive threshold, 
in that a company which did not meet 
these standards could still qualify 
– for example, if the management 
and underwriter provided detailed 
evidence of the healthy state of the 
company. But introducing a threshold 
had become essential to curb abuse by 
some Chinese listed companies.
Then in 2002, the CSRC raised 
the bar to a three-year average ROE 
of 10 per cent and a minimum ROE 
of 10 per cent in the previous year. 
Since the threshold introduced in 
2001 allowed some exemptions, 
management and underwriters 
were able to collude to help poor 
companies to gain additional market 
resources. For example, Wuhan 
Department Store Group announced 
a seasoned equity offering proposal 
immediately after the 2001 regulation 
went into effect – even though its 
ROEs between 1998 and 2000 had 
been 3.16 per cent, 2.72 per cent and 
2.41 per cent, all below 6 per cent.
So what lessons can be learnt from 
the Chinese experience? The various 
regulations on rights offerings and 
SEOs detailed above imposed at least 
two types of cost on China’s capital 
markets. The first was the earnings 
“management” needed to achieve 
the numerical accounting threshold. 
Managers of poorly performing 
companies could manipulate 
accounting numbers to meet the 
threshold in order that they could 
then raise additional capital from 
investors. Thus investors’ capital may 
be allocated to less efficient projects, 
to their disadvantage.
The second cost of a numerical 
threshold was that it could exclude 
firms with a potential for good future 
performance, and allow firms with 
probable poor future performance 
to conduct rights offerings or SEOs. 
Despite the costs that have resulted 
from adopting numerical rules, the 
Chinese government continues to use 
a similar approach to establish rights 
issues and SEO qualifications, arguing 
that accounting-based regulation helps 
to minimise resource misallocation, and 
that regulation can reduce the adverse 
selection problem in equity offerings.
The message is clear. Any emerging 
market government that wants to 
introduce accounting-based regulation 
must have an excellent understanding 
of the status of its capital markets. 
Governments need to promote rigorous 
capital market research by academics 
and consultants and undertake other 
investigations to ensure that they 
understand the demand and supply 
of their capital markets. They need 
to impose a strong threshold when 
the first regulations are introduced, 
but also actively to monitor market 
reaction and adjust their rules to take 
genuine concerns into account. In this 
way, they can maximise the benefits 
of accounting-based regulation and 
avoid imposing unnecessary burdens 
on the markets. 
      Any  
emerging market 
government that 
wants to introduce 
accounting-based 
regulation  
must have 
an excellent 
understanding  
of the status  
of its capital  
markets.
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facilitated here by the international brokers, who 
will look to deliver the banking and credit facili-
ties needed by the public and private sectors.
Already a significant number have arrived in 
Yangon.  Many  do  not  work  for  large  banking 
institutions but are either freelances or work for 
boutique  investment  advisory  companies.  They 
seek to invest directly or on behalf of their high-
net-worth clients. As this network grows, so will 
the size of deals and, correspondingly, liquidity.
The success of these financial entrepreneurs is 
the key to Myanmar’s future in securing funding 
for infrastructure projects. For example, shortage 
of capital has led to some delays in Dawei, a $56 
billion 10-year project which includes a deep-sea 
port and a special economic zone, an integrated 
steel mill, oil and gas project, and a petrochemical 
complex, as well as a fertiliser plant.
Even  though  the  Thai  government  made  a 
commitment to provide $1 billion in funding, 
the  developer,  the  Italian-owned  Thai  Devel-
opment  (ITD),  has  had  difficulty  arranging 
adequate financing. In July, ITD’s main partner, 
Max Myanmar, announced its withdrawal from 
the  venture.  ITD  now  hopes  to  secure  three-
quarters of the financing from various Japanese 
financial institutions.
As Myanmar seeks solutions to the financing 
challenge, brokers are drawing parallels with the 
strategies adopted by Indonesia and the Philip-
pines. Having developed strong financing struc-
tures in partnership with such institutions as the 
IMF, the World Bank and the Asia Development 
Bank, they were able to tap into enormous global 
funding resources, lightening the burden on the 
state budget. It is essential that Myanmar provides 
the appropriate structures and transparency if it is 
to access these funds. Indeed it may also help trig-
ger the involvement of international banks, which 
cannot alone deliver enough funding, given the 
size and scope of Myanmar’s projects.
A  further  benefit  is  that  the  involvement  of 
Golden 
opportunity
  T
here  can  be  no  clearer  evidence 
of  the  transformation  in  Myanmar’s 
global standing than the presence of 
so many international investors in its 
commercial centre, Yangon. Flights to and from 
the city are consistently full, the cost of hotel 
rooms  –  even  in  the  current  low-peak  mon-
soon season – has leapt from $75 a night just six 
months ago to $250, and restaurants are inun-
dated with international bankers and business 
leaders looking for ways into one of the world’s 
last significant untapped economies.
Myanmar, after 50 years of economic isolation 
and deterioration, is fast becoming one of the most 
talked-about emerging market investment stories. 
Investors had been waiting patiently for the right 
signals before establishing a presence in what was 
once the jewel of South-East Asia. Now the green 
light has been given. The political foundations are 
in place, a significant portent being the election to 
parliament in 2012 of Aung San Suu Kyi. This was 
followed three months later by a far-reaching shift 
in American policy when the Obama administra-
tion lifted nearly all its economic sanctions.
It is no surprise that international investors have 
responded so positively. Myanmar has abundant 
natural resources, including the world’s largest 
ruby and jade deposits, 90 per cent of the world’s 
teak, the fourth-largest natural gas reserves and 
some 60 million consumers on tap. It is planning 
huge investment in rebuilding its infrastructure. 
The largest ten projects in the pipeline are worth 
$90  billion,  and  will  include  roads,  railways, 
sewage and power networks, as well as ports to 
match the largest in the world.
With limited public sector resources available, 
this programme of reconstruction will require 
not  only  international  technical  expertise  but 
also global funding – and foreign investors will 
only commit if they are comfortable with the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) laws. The signs 
here are also positive. The government is prepar-
ing a new foreign investment law, which aims to 
preserve  territorial  and  economic  sovereignty 
while  ceding  the  rights  foreign  investors  will 
insist on, including the right of ownership.
Finalising  this  law  is  proving  to  be  a  slow 
process,  though  this  hardly  makes  Myanmar 
unique among emerging and frontier markets. 
However, there is no doubting the government’s 
commitment to reform. From politicians to busi-
ness leaders, diplomats and taxi drivers, there is 
a conviction that the paradigm shift to economic 
openness is “real and irreversible” – and most 
significantly, the government is widely praised 
for supporting reform.
The new foreign investment law is only part 
of the solution. Without a channel to allocate 
money and resources efficiently, it is unlikely 
that incoming FDI will deliver its full benefit to 
the economy. As has been the case in the early 
days  of  every  emerging  market,  this  will  be 
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Now that the political signals are favourable,  
the influx of international entrepreneurs  
is the key to what could be a glittering future  
for Myanmar and its commercial centre,  
Yangon, says William Selig.
     There is a risk to entering 
Myanmar today, but also a 
risk that those who hesitate 
will be left behind when  
the country takes off on  
its path of rapid growthinternational  agencies  and  foreign  investors  in 
infrastructure  projects  would  assist  Myanmar’s 
banking and financial sector to develop sufficient-
ly to support the country’s growth plans. As they 
see opportunities, local and foreign investors will 
press for domestic financial and capital markets.
At  present,  the  creation  of  an  efficient  and 
transparent system of financing sources is at an 
early stage. However, there are clear signs that 
the  problems  are  being  addressed.  In  March, 
currency reform ended the opaque and complex 
multiple exchange-rate system used for the last 
35 years. The government is also actively promot-
ing growth in the banking sector. A year ago, the 
central bank authorised 17 local private banks to 
open 57 money exchange counters and licensed 11 
to conduct foreign banking services.
While the central bank is confident that bet-
ter management and information systems will 
make local banks sufficiently competitive, this 
may  be  over-optimistic.  Greater  foreign  bank 
participation  will  be  needed  for  the  financial 
sector to keep pace with the country’s economic 
restructuring, and there is little doubt that the 
presence of international banks would lead to its 
exponential growth.
Today, there are four state-owned banks, 19 
private domestic banks, one finance company 
(the state-run insurance programme) and 17 for-
eign bank representative offices. Shortcomings 
are evident from the list of prohibitive regula-
tions, including a cap on deposit interest rates 
below the prevailing inflation rate, a ban on pri-
vate commercial bank lending to farmers, and 
complex rules on collecting interest from loans. 
There are no basic resources such as a credit rat-
ing system and properly trained staff to manage 
it. This gap deters the inflow of international 
capital and this will need to be addressed.
Modernising the financial system and corpo-
rate environment will require time and effort. 
But the government is clearly eager to address 
the problems; and the presence of more brokers, 
financiers  and  business  executives  reflects  a 
growing belief that the opportunities in Myan-
mar outweigh the risks.
Some recent visitors to Yangon have said they 
would return in a few years when the country is 
better set up for foreign investment. However, just 
as there is a risk to entering Myanmar today, so 
there is also a risk that those who hesitate will be 
left behind when the country takes off on its path 
of rapid growth. Each investor has to weigh the 
balance of these risks. Those who decide to invest 
will be taking what may well be one of the last 
chances in a very long time to participate in such 
a promising, large frontier market story. 
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      In March, currency 
reform ended the opaque 
and complex multiple 
exchange-rate system  
used for the last 35 years
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